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In the past fifteen years, the United States Supreme Court has decided three cases in which it tentatively began
to explore what the United States Constitution has to say about issues that are popularly described as the
"right to die." In this article, I suggest that the current state of constitutional analysis does not provide for an
effective mechanism for securing an individual's "right to die," at least not without undervaluing a state's
interest in the preservation of human life should a state choose to take such a position. In the article, I suggest
that it is possible to adopt a means of balancing the competing interests of the individual and of the state in
such a way as to do service to both of them. I propose that the Court adopt a balancing standard modeled
generally on, but by no means identical to, the current constitutional mechanism under which infringements
on a woman's right to have an abortion during the period prior to fetal viability are judged. In other words, I
propose the adoption of an undue bruden standard similar to that articulated in Casey. In the article I explain
why the current state of affairs is deficient. Thereafter, I explore the undue burden standard I propose,
explaining how it would address the deficiencies in current law as well as cure many of the problems identified
with the Casey standard itself. Finally, I apply the standard to several scenarios. I ultimately conclude that
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In the past fifteen years, the United States Supreme Court has 
decided three cases in which it tentatively began to explore what, if 
anything, the United States Constitution has to do with an 
individual’s choice concerning the time and manner of one’s death.1  
In common parlance, the Court has begun to address the so-called 
“right to die.”2  These decisions have not ended public debate about 
or policy developments in the states concerning the right to die.  
Indeed, the Court intentionally sought to avoid restricting policy 
debates too quickly by treading cautiously in its right to die 
decisions.3  Thus, we have been in a period of continued innovation 
                                                          
 1. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (reversing the decision of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals that New York State’s ban on physician-assisted suicide was 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (reversing the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals that Washington State’s ban on physician-assisted suicide 
was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (affirming the decision of 
the Missouri Supreme Court that it was permissible under the United States 
Constitution to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person’s 
intent to refuse medical treatment). 
 2. Definitional issues are important in the debate concerning a person’s right to 
control the manner of her death.  See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789-90 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (discussing the importance of defining the right that is at issue in any 
given case); 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 1.1 (2d ed. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
1995) (discussing the definitional issues surrounding the popular and legal 
connotations of the phrase “right to die”); Rebecca C. Morgan et al., The Issue of 
Personal Choice:  The Competent Incurable Patient and the Right to Commit Suicide, 57 MO. 
L. REV. 1, 17 n.109 (1992) (discussing use of “right to die” as a “term of art”).  I most 
often use the phrase “right to die” in its broadest possible sense, referring to the wide 
array of factual settings dealing with the end-of-life.  Such situations include 
physician-assisted suicide, decisions by competent adults to decline or remove life-
sustaining treatment, and choices made on behalf of children or incompetent adults 
concerning such matters.  See generally Michael P. Allen, Life, Death, and Advocacy:  
Rules of Procedure in the Contested End-of-Life Case, 34 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (describing in detail the 
range of potential end-of-life situations); Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, 
Experimenting with the “Right to Die” in the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253 
(1991); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L. J. 1123, 1126-27 (1997). 
 3. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735 (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are 
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and 
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and experimentation concerning the right to die and its regulation 
through the democratic process in its various forms.4 
There is much to be said for experimentation in the states 
concerning an issue such as the right to die.  After all, one of the 
apparent advantages of a federal system such as the one enshrined in 
our Constitution is the ability of states to observe and learn from the 
actions of their sister states when addressing a common social 
problem.5  The danger is that, in being faithful to the “laboratory” 
metaphor6 of Justices Brandeis and O’Connor, some state 
experiments may produce monsters instead of miracles.  In other 
words, some states could, by intention, inadvertence, or even chance, 
infringe upon the individual rights of the people.  The challenge for 
the Court becomes crafting a mechanism by which the valuable 
democratic experimentation can continue while the rights of the 
people remain secure. 
The starting point for this Article is that the current state of affairs 
does not provide an effective mechanism for securing an individual’s 
right to die, at least not without undervaluing a state’s interest in the 
preservation of human life.  Even though a state is not compelled to 
do so, its decision to stand in support of life should not be easily 
rejected.7  But how does one correctly engage in the delicate 
balancing necessary to protect and preserve both of these interests?  
It is this question that I seek to explore.  While I advocate a broader 
right to die at the conclusion of the Article, in order to work through 
the question I have identified, I will focus principally on one type of 
                                                          
practicality of physician-assisted suicide.  Our holding permits this debate to 
continue, as it should in a democratic society.”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (noting that the Court’s decision allowed the law concerning an 
incompetent person’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment to be 
“entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States . . . in the first instance”) (quoting New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 4. See generally MEISEL, supra note 2, § 1.7 (cataloguing legislative and judicial 
developments concerning end-of-life matters). 
 5. Of course, this point is not always taken as an affirmatively positive aspect of 
federalism.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 12-
18 (2002) (discussing some criticisms of allowing states to experiment, collecting 
literature on the topic, and ultimately rejecting the criticism).  This Article will not 
debate the merits of state experimentation within the broader federal union.  
Instead, it accepts that the Court believes that benefits of such experimentation exist.  
See, e.g., supra note 1 (citing cases in which the Supreme Court advocates state 
experimentation in the formulation of “right to die” policies). 
 6. New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
federal government must allow states to remold economic and regulative practices in 
order to meet changing social and economic needs because the states serve as small 
laboratories for the experimentation of bold new social and economic policies). 
 7. See infra Part I.B (discussing the legitimacy of a state’s interest in the 
preservation and protection of human life). 
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situation implicating the right:  a person’s right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment even when such refusal will lead to the 
person’s death.8 
To be clear, this Article is not about whether the right to refuse 
treatment should be entitled to constitutional protection.9  That topic 
has been well-mined.10  Instead, this Article proceeds largely on the 
assumption that the right to refuse treatment is protected by the Due 
Process Clause.11  Moreover, this Article assumes that it is a 
“fundamental right” as that term is used in constitutional 
jurisprudence.  As discussed below, the Supreme Court’s current 
                                                          
 8. For most of my discussion, I do not distinguish between the refusal of 
treatment by a competent adult and the refusal of such treatment on behalf of an 
incompetent adult.  By combining these situations I do not mean to imply that they 
present the same issues.  In fact, the differences between these two situations are 
quite important.  For example, in the latter situation we must face how it is that an 
incompetent person can be said to be exercising a right to refuse treatment when, by 
definition, she is not competent to act.  See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-80 (recognizing 
and discussing this issue).  Near the end of this Article I address how the proposal I 
advocate might lead to different results in these two situations.  See infra Part III 
(articulating the different outcomes of an undue burden analysis of Terri’s Law 
compared to an analysis of a hypothetical state law allowing a limited right to refuse 
medical treatment when the patient has a “living will”).  For purposes of articulating 
my generic proposal, however, there is no need to treat the situations differently. 
 9. Nor does this Article address the profound moral, ethical, and religious 
aspects of the general debate concerning whether an individual has the right—apart 
from whatever the Constitution has to say on the subject—to determine the time and 
manner of one’s death.  Many others have addressed this likely eternal debate.  See, 
e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION (Alfred A. Knopf 1993); Brian C. Kalt, 
Death, Ethics, and the State, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2000); DAVID ORENTLICHER, 
MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH (2001); RAYMOND WHITING, A NATURAL RIGHT TO DIE:  
TWENTY-THREE CENTURIES OF DEBATE (2002). 
 10. See, e.g., NORMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING (1987); 
PETER J. RIGA, RIGHT TO DIE OR RIGHT TO LIVE (1981); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LETTING GO:  
DEATH, DYING, AND THE LAW (1993); Norman L. Cantor, A Patient’s Decision to Decline 
Life-Saving Medical Treatment:  Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 228 (1973); Eaton & Larson, supra note 2; Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of 
Dying, 79 CAL. L. REV. 89 (1991); Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die:  Legal and 
Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857 (1992); Yale Kamisar, When Is There a 
Constitutional “Right to Die”?  When Is There No Constitutional “Right to Live”?, 25 GA. L. 
REV. 1203 (1991); Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Coming to Terms with 
Death:  The Cruzan Case, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 817 (1991); Thomas Wm. Mayo, 
Constitutionalizing the “Right to Die”, 49 MD. L. REV. 103 (1990); Stewart G. Pollock, Life 
and Death Decisions:  Who Makes Them and By What Standards?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 505 
(1989); John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment 
Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139 (1991); Vincent J. Samar, Is the 
Right to Die Dead?, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 221 (2000); Mark Strasser, Incompetents and the 
Right to Die:  In Search of Consistent Meaningful Standards, 83 KY. L.J. 733 (1995); Brian 
C. Goebel, Comment, Who Decides If There Is “Triumph in the Ultimate Agony?”  
Constitutional Theory and the Emerging Right to Die with Dignity, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
827 (1996). 
 11. While I make this assumption, I discuss the right further below.  See infra Part 
I.A (discussing the Court’s ruling that the Due Process Clause encompasses the 
liberty interest inherent in the freedom to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment). 
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fundamental rights jurisprudence12 makes it likely that either the 
individual’s right to refuse treatment or the state’s interest in 
preserving life would consistently lose were a court to engage in 
traditional balancing of a state interest that could be “compelling” 
against a right deemed “fundamental.”13  At its core, this Article is 
about a limited alternative to this almost binary, zero-sum approach 
to constitutional balancing in this area in which, for all practical 
purposes, either the state interest (if it is found to be compelling) or 
the individual right (if it is found to be fundamental) will always 
prevail.14 
The Court should adopt a balancing standard modeled generally 
on, but in no means identical to, the current constitutional 
mechanism under which infringements on a woman’s right to have 
an abortion in the period prior to fetal viability are judged:  the 
“undue burden” standard of the operative opinion in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.15  As I would 
reformulate the standard, a court should strike down any government 
regulation that (a) has the effect of creating a substantial obstacle to 
an individual’s exercise of one’s right to refuse medical treatment16 or 
(b) has the primary purpose of creating an obstacle (whether 
substantial or otherwise) in the exercise of the right instead of 
advancing the state’s interest in the protection and preservation of 
life.17  This Article is devoted principally to explaining the standard I 
propose and exploring its applications in several situations in which a 
state infringes upon an individual’s right to refuse medical treatment 
in one way or another. 
Before turning to that enterprise, however, it is fair to ask “why 
now?”  In other words, why is it important that scholarly attention 
should focus on balancing the competing interests of the state and 
the individual today?  After all, has not the experimentation the 
                                                          
 12. See infra Part I.C (articulating the Court’s distinction between fundamental 
rights and other rights and the standard of review appropriate for both cases). 
 13. See infra Part I.C (describing the traditional constitutional fundamental rights 
jurisprudence). 
 14. I explain this approach below and why it is particularly troubling in the right 
to die context.  See infra Part I.C (insisting that the right to life is different from other 
fundamental rights and, therefore, must be subject to a test other than strict 
scrutiny). 
 15. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  By “operative opinion,” I refer to the joint opinion of 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. 
 16. See infra Part II.B (describing the operation of the effects prong of the undue 
burden standard I propose). 
 17. See infra Part II.C (describing the operation of the purpose prong of the 
undue burden standard I propose).  If the primary motivation for state action is not 
protecting life, then the legislation should be struck down.  This “purpose” prong 
also deters government actions motivated purely by a desire to restrict these rights. 
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Supreme Court hoped for been working?  The fact is that in the years 
since the Supreme Court decided Cruzan18 and took its first tentative 
steps in this area, the right has not been as secure as one would think.  
Both the Court’s equivocal stance on the right’s constitutional 
pedigree and a mobilization of forces on the political front are 
threats to the individual’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment. 
A recent example widely reported in the national media forcefully 
demonstrates this point.  In February 1990, twenty-seven year-old 
Terri Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest causing her brain to be 
deprived of oxygen for over ten minutes.19  As a result, Ms. Schiavo 
entered a “persistent vegetative state.”20  After Ms. Schiavo had existed 
in this state for nearly eight years, her husband sought a court order 
directing the cessation of the artificial nutrition and hydration 
sustaining his wife.21  Ms. Schiavo’s parents opposed the request and 
thus began a protracted legal battle over Ms. Schiavo’s fate.22 
Given her physical condition and the discord in her family, Terri 
Schiavo’s case could only be considered a tragedy.  For present 
purposes, however, what is particularly important is what happened 
after a judicial decision concerning Mr. Schiavo’s request had been 
rendered.  Over ten years after Mr. Schiavo made his request, it was 
finally judicially determined that, if she were competent, Terri 
Schiavo would not have intended to continue receiving artificial 
nutrition and hydration.23  Accordingly, a Florida state court directed 
that such life-sustaining measures be discontinued.24  The court’s 
order was carried out on October 15, 2003.25 
                                                          
 18. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 19. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 20. Id.  In a “persistent vegetative state” a person’s body is able to support basic 
life functions such as temperature, circulation, and respiration without artificial 
means.  However, the person lacks the higher brain functions necessary for self-
awareness and thought.  See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266 n.1 (discussing the accepted 
definition of “persistent vegetative state”); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 746 (Md. 
1993) (“The distinguishing feature of a patient in a persistent vegetative state is 
wakefulness without awareness.”). 
 21. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 178. 
 22. Id.  I have described elsewhere the lawsuits concerning Terri Schiavo in 
greater detail.  See Allen, supra note 2. 
 23. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).  
Ms. Schiavo did not have a written advance directive, or so-called “living will.”  In re 
Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 180.  Therefore, the court proceeded to 
determine her intent based on evidence of her wishes gleaned from conversations 
with family and friends.  See id. at 179-80.  Such a procedure is in accord with Florida 
statutory law.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 765.401 (2004) (mandating the statutory 
scheme under which health care decisions may be made on behalf of an 
incompetent person). 
 24. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d at 187.  This determination was 
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After Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube had been removed, a startling 
thing happened.  On October 21, 2003, the Florida Legislature 
passed and Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed “Terri’s Law.”26  The 
Legislature held no hearings concerning this bill which was enacted 
and signed into law just over twenty-four hours after its introduction.27  
Under Terri’s Law, the Governor was given the authority to issue a 
“one-time stay to prevent the withholding of nutrition and hydration” 
from a person in Terri’s Schiavo’s position.28  Immediately after 
signing the bill that would become Terri’s Law, Governor Bush issued 
a “stay” pursuant to which Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube was reinserted 
into her body.29  Thus, the Governor and Legislature essentially used 
Terri’s Law to reverse the judgment of the Florida state courts 
concerning Ms. Schiavo’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.30 
                                                          
ultimately affirmed after at least four reported decisions were rendered by an 
intermediate appellate court.  See id. at 182 (affirming the guardianship court’s 
decision that Schiavo would choose to discontinue life-sustaining treatment and 
affirming the denial of the motion for relief from that judgment); In re Guardianship 
of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s 
denial of the petition for removal of guardian and the motion to disqualify, but 
reversing and remanding the trial court’s denial of the parents’ motion for relief 
from judgment and the petition for independent medical examination); In re 
Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (directing the 
guardianship court to permit Ms. Schiavo’s parents to file a motion for relief from 
judgment based on equitable principles); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 
176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s decision ordering the 
removal of life support).  In addition, the Florida Supreme Court has declined to 
review the matter three times.  See Schindler v. Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003); In 
re Guardianship of Schiavo, 816 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2002); Schindler v. Schiavo, 789 So. 
2d 348 (Fla. 2001). 
 25. Woman’s Feeding Tube Removed, CNN, Oct. 16, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2003/LAW/10/15/coma.woman/index.html (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 26. FLA. STAT. ch. 744.3215 (2003).  For a description of the history of House Bill 
35E, see FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY FOR HOUSE 




(Oct. 21, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 27. FLA. STAT. ch. 744.3215 (2003).  See also Steve Bousquet, How Terri’s Law Came 
to Pass, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at B1.   
 28. Governor—Feeding Tube Removal Stay, 2003 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 418 (West).  
Although Terri’s Law was not denominated as a “special bill” relating to one person 
under Florida law, the prerequisites for actions set out in the law perfectly match 
Terri Schiavo’s conditions, and almost certainly no one else’s.  See Terri’s Law—
Subversion of the Right to Die?, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2003, at 19 [hereinafter 
“Subversion of the Right to Die?”] (“[Terri’s Law] was drawn as narrowly as possible to fit 
Terri Schiavo’s factual circumstances perfectly.”). 
 29. See William R. Levesque et al., Gov. Bush Order Puts Schiavo Back on Fluids, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at 1A. 
 30. In a recent decision, a Florida Circuit Court declared Terri’s Law 
unconstitutional and granted Mr. Schiavo’s motion for summary judgment.  Schiavo 
v. Bush, No. 03-008212-CI-20, 2004 WL 980028 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 5, 2004).  The 
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The legislative interference with the judicial process and its impact 
on an individual’s rights provides an even greater impetus for the 
action I advocate when one considers the political forces that 
apparently led to Terri’s Law.31  It appears that conservative political 
forces made concerted efforts to pressure Florida politicians to enact 
the law, both out of a concern for Ms. Schiavo and as a means to 
advance their broader political pro-life/anti-abortion agenda.32  In 
short, the story of Terri’s Law is a veritable “poster child” for why 
those concerned with the preservation of the right to refuse medical 
treatment need to consider how best to protect that right today. 
Moreover, while the Florida Legislature’s attempt through Terri’s 
Law to interfere so directly in a completed judicial proceeding is 
quite rare, there is no shortage of examples of other interference in 
end-of-life dramas.  For example, there was a widely publicized case in 
which the Governor of Virginia sought to prevent the removal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration from a man injured in an accident 
even though no member of the man’s family objected to the 
removal.33  There have also been instances in which local prosecutors 
actively opposed families’ requests to terminate life-sustaining 
                                                          
Supreme Court of Florida has agreed to hear the Governor’s appeal of the Circuit 
Court’s decision.  See Bush v. Schiavo, Case No. SC04-925 (Fla. June 16, 2004). 
 31. Below, I discuss the application of the proposed undue burden test to Terri’s 
Law.  See infra Part III.A (indicating that an application of the undue burden test to 
Terri’s Law would be successful due to the “purpose” prong of the analysis). 
 32. There is further discussion below of Terri’s Law in which these themes are 
explored in greater detail and appropriate citations are provided.  See infra Part III.A 
(noting that the manner in which Terri’s Law was passed and its absence of any 
legislative history does nothing to refute the presumption that certain political 
groups motivated the legislature’s swift action).  Others have commented on the 
relationship between politics in the Schiavo case and the legal status of a right to 
refuse unwanted medical treatment.  See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Book Review, 14 L. 
& POL. BOOK REV. 1 (2004) (describing Terri’s Law and commenting that “[i]t 
became clear that end of life decision-making, while seemingly clearly settled law, 
may still be ambiguous or at least politically contentious in the twenty-first century.”) 
at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/Behuniak-Svenson 
104.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).  In a similar vein, other 
commentators have discussed the more general potential impact of political forces 
on end-of-life issues.  See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices:  
Voting Life and Death at the Ballot Box, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799 (1995).  Other 
commentators have written generally about the growth of the right to die issue in 
politics and how those politics are translated into policies.  See HENRY R. GLICK, THE 
RIGHT TO DIE POLICY INNOVATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1992). 
 33. See, e.g., Paul Bradley, Gilmore Appeal Denied; Michele Finn is ‘Relieved,’ Decries 
Governor’s Actions, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1998, at 1A; Paul Bradley, Tube Pulled 
that Keeps Finn Alive; Family of Severely Disabled Man Acts as Gilmore Vows to Appeal, RICH. 
TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1998, at 1A; Holly A. Heyser, Does Hugh Finn Have a Right to 
Die?; Astounding Some, Gov. Gilmore Fights Choice of Family to Remove Tube from Comatose 
Man, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 2, 1998, at 1A.  The case eventually reached the Supreme 
Court of Virginia.  See Gilmore v. Finn, 527 S.E.2d 426 (Va. 2000). 
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treatment for children.34  Finally, there have been interventions of 
state law enforcement officials to prevent the removal of such 
treatment.35  All of these examples of government action have taken 
place after the Court’s decision in Cruzan.36 
What these various actions vividly demonstrate is that there is a 
danger that the application of political forces may lead to the 
infringement of an individual’s right to refuse medical treatment.  
For those who support this right, it is tempting to argue that the 
Court should recognize the right as fundamental and, under 
traditional fundamental rights jurisprudence, effectively stop all 
infringements.  The problem with such an approach is that to do so 
would undervalue the state’s legitimate interest in preserving life in 
all forms when a state chooses to adopt a pro-life policy.  The policy 
that must be adopted must balance these two interests so that they 
may coexist to the fullest extent possible.37  My “undue burden” 
proposal will do so over the widest range of situations. 
                                                          
 34. See, e.g., In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).  In 
Rosebush, an eleven-year-old child, Joelle, had been involved in a car accident, and as 
a result, her brain was deprived of oxygen for a significant period of time.  Id. at 634.  
The lack of oxygen “destroyed most, if not all, of Joelle’s cerebral functions, and left 
her in a persistent vegetative state.”  Id. at 634-35.  After she had existed in this state 
for over a year, Joelle’s parents decided to remove her from a respirator and other 
life-sustaining devices.  Id. at 635.  The parents’ decision was supported by Joelle’s 
treating physicians, a hospital ethics committee, and the family’s Catholic priest.  Id.  
Anonymous hospital staff members opposed the decision and contacted the local 
state attorney.  Id.  Thereafter, the local state attorney successfully sought preliminary 
injunctive relief preventing the removal of life-sustaining treatment.  Id.  The trial 
court dissolved the injunction after trial and Joelle died shortly after her respirator 
was removed.  Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Blouin v. Superior Court, 356 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 2004).  The case 
concerned a Section 1983 action against New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer for his office’s intervention in the efforts to remove life-sustaining treatment 
from an incompetent adult.  Id. at 351.  The suit failed because the court ruled that 
the constitutional status of an incompetent person’s right to refuse medical 
treatment was unclear.  Id. at 360.  The Blouin case is discussed below in more detail.  
See infra Part I.A (analyzing the Blouin case and clarifying that the case was dismissed 
due to the court’s determination that the state actors had qualified immunity under 
Section 1983). 
 36. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 37. It is true that the right to refuse medical treatment has been held to be 
protected by several state constitutions.  See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 
417 n.12 (Mo. 1988) (presenting examples of state court recognition of a state 
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment while declining to recognize this 
right under the Missouri Constitution), aff’d sub nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  Such state-based protection is insufficient for the right 
at issue for two reasons.  First, allowing protection to be recognized on a state-by-state 
basis would create a type of patchwork quilt in which the right would be protected in 
one state but perhaps not in a neighboring state.  Cf. Daar, supra note 32, at 853-55 
(explaining that inequity would result from protecting rights via the initiative 
process, because only some states allow such a process).  For a right as important as 
the ability to refuse medical treatment, such inconsistent protection is unacceptable. 
A second reason that state constitutional protection is insufficient is that the 
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Part I of this Article lays out the relevant background principles 
and working assumptions, focusing on three issues:  (1) the current 
constitutional status of the right to refuse medical treatment and the 
outlines of the argument for considering that right to be 
fundamental; (2) the legitimacy of a state’s choice to assert an 
unqualified interest in the preservation of life within the 
constitutional framework and why that interest should be considered 
compelling; and (3) an explanation of why the Supreme Court’s 
current fundamental rights jurisprudence is not adequate to allow 
the individual right and the state interest to coexist in a meaningful 
way.  Part II describes my suggested undue burden standard as a 
better means to balance the competing interests.  I also contrast this 
suggested standard with the one the Court articulated in Casey, 
addressing along the way some concerns commentators have raised 
about the Casey articulation of the standard.  To explore my 
suggested test, Part III applies it to three situations in which the 
state’s interest in life is pitted against an individual’s right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment.  This experiment emphasizes certain 
strengths of the standard and exposes some potential weaknesses that 
become apparent in its application.  Finally, Part IV concludes the 
Article by providing a suggestion of how this standard could apply 
more broadly to the right to die.  However, I also provide a 
cautionary note about expanding any form of an undue burden 
                                                          
amendment process for state constitutions is generally easier than that for amending 
the United States Constitution, making state rights less secure than federal rights.  
For example, since the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, there have been only 
seventeen amendments to the United States Constitution.  This is an average of less 
than one every decade.  G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23 
(1998).  As of 1996, there had been 5,900 amendments adopted on the state level, or 
an average of about 120 per state.  Id. at 24.  Moreover, this figure is conservative 
because it does not take into account amendments to any state’s prior constitutions.  
Id.  This is important because only nineteen states still have their original 
constitution in place, and a majority of states had three or more constitutions.  Id. at 
23.  Thus, state constitutional protection is not as secure as one might otherwise 
expect. 
Similarly, it is true that the right to refuse medical treatment is generally protected 
as a common law or statutory right.  See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-77 (cataloguing 
state case law sources of the right).  The difficulty in terms of right-protection here is 
that a state legislature is always able to amend a statute to eliminate a statutory right 
or enact legislation to alter the common law right. See, e.g., McConnell v. Beverly 
Enters.-Connecticut, Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 606-07 (Conn. 1989) (Healy, J., concurring) 
(discussing, in an end-of-life case, the power of the legislature to alter the common 
law).  Therefore, the common law and statutory rights exist at the pleasure of the 
legislature and are subject to political pressures.  At the end of the day, it is essential 
that the Federal Constitution provides a safety-net for the right to refuse medical 
treatment.  Other commentators have drawn this same basic conclusion.  See, e.g., 
Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 10, at 850-51 (arguing that a minimum national 
standard is required in order to protect a right to die). 
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standard to areas beyond the right to die, including, but not limited 
to, the subject of abortion from which I drew my inspiration. 
I. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES:  THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL 
TREATMENT, THE STATE’S INTEREST IN PRESERVING LIFE, AND 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
In this Part, I set the stage for developing my undue burden 
balancing mechanism by discussing three broad background 
principles:  the current state of a constitutional right to refuse 
medical treatment even when doing so would lead to death and a 
limited defense of why that right should be considered fundamental; 
a justification of the legitimacy of a state’s unqualified interest in the 
preservation and protection of human life; and, a consideration of 
current fundamental rights jurisprudence and why its essentially 
binary nature does not allow for the meaningful coexistence of the 
individual’s right and the state’s interest in life.  My aim is not to 
provide a comprehensive discussion of any of these points.  Rather, 
this Part presents a series of descriptions and limited assumptions 
designed to focus on the task a court faces when balancing the 
individual’s right to refuse medical treatment and the state’s interest 
in the preservation of life. 
A. The Constitutional Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
As promised earlier, this Article decidedly is not intended to be a 
defense of the argument that the United States Constitution provides 
protection for the right to refuse medical treatment.38  To reach the 
question I wish to address, I will assume that the right (a) is protected 
as a matter of Due Process and (b) is one of those “fundamental” 
rights deserving of the heightened protection of courts. 
Given my assumptions, it might seem unnecessary to devote any 
time to the current constitutional status of the right to refuse medical 
treatment.  However, this discussion is important because the current 
status is a reflection, at least in part, of the difficulty courts face when 
trying to balance such an intimately personal matter as the refusal of 
medical treatment with the preservation of human life.39  The nature 
of this balancing exercise in its traditional form would make it 
difficult for courts to simultaneously accord clear protection to the 
                                                          
 38. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 39. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88 (explaining that the individual’s 
interest in refusing medical treatment and the competing state’s interest in 
preserving life are difficult to balance because of the profound implications of each). 
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individual right and the state’s interests.40  This difficulty has caused 
courts to describe the right in equivocal and conditional terms.  I 
hope to show that if the courts adopt the balancing mechanism I 
suggest, the clarity with which they define the constitutional status 
and scope of the right will be increased while still allowing for 
appropriate deference to a state’s democratically-determined 
decision to protect life. 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional status of the right 
to refuse unwanted medical treatment in its landmark Cruzan 
decision.41  After discussing the common law right to be free from 
unwanted touching, the right of informed consent to medical 
procedures,42 and Supreme Court Due Process precedent,43 the Court 
described the constitutional status of a right to refuse medical 
treatment in the following terms: 
Although we think the logic of the [Due Process] cases discussed 
above would embrace such a liberty interest [in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment], the dramatic consequences involved 
in refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether 
the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally permissible.  But 
for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States 
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.44 
As the quotation makes clear, the majority opinion in Cruzan 
discusses a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment in a 
conditional sense, only assuming that the right exists.45  The Court 
                                                          
 40. See infra Part I.C (describing a due process analysis as an essentially binary 
decision in which an individual right is afforded great protection if defined as 
“fundamental,” whereas the state interest benefits if the individual interest is not 
deemed “fundamental”). 
 41. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  The case 
concerned Nancy Cruzan, a young woman in a persistent vegetative state resulting 
from loss of oxygen to the brain after a car accident.  Id. at 266.  Nancy’s parents 
sought permission to cease providing nutrition and hydration to their daughter.  Id. 
at 267-68.  A Missouri trial court ruled in the parents’ favor.  Id. at 268.  The Missouri 
Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that there was insufficient evidence 
of Nancy’s intent concerning the withdrawal of such life-sustaining treatment.  Id.  
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme 
Court, holding that it was constitutionally permissible, although not required, for a 
state to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person’s wishes 
concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.  Id. at 286-87.  The lawyer for 
Nancy Cruzan’s parents provides an interesting and in-depth perspective on the 
litigation leading up to and including the landmark Supreme Court decision.  See 
WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE:  THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN (2002). 
 42. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. 
 43. Id. at 278-79. 
 44. Id. at 279. 
 45. The Court later reiterated the conditional nature of the right but also sent 
signals strongly suggesting that the right had constitutional dimensions.  Washington 
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further assumes that the right to refuse medical treatment is not 
restricted to competent adults.  Rather, while recognizing that there 
are difficulties associated with the manner in which that right can be 
exercised, the Court’s opinion accepts, for purposes of the decision, 
that an incompetent person retains the assumed constitutional right 
to refuse medical treatment.46 
The cautious nature of the Supreme Court’s language in Cruzan 
has led to a level of uncertainty in the lower courts concerning the 
existence and scope of any right to refuse treatment that is protected 
under the Constitution.47  More troubling, however, is that the 
Court’s equivocation in Cruzan has had, and continues to have, 
substantive implications in the way lower courts address end-of-life 
issues.  Two examples make this point.  The first concerns the 
question of what protection, if any, the Constitution affords to a 
person’s choice to have the assistance of a physician in ending one’s 
life.  Two courts have considered this issue and rejected the claim for 
constitutional protection in ending a life, basing their decision, at 
least in part, on the conditional and uncertain language in Cruzan.48  
                                                          
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“We have also assumed, and strongly 
suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse 
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”).  Moreover, Justice O’Connor in her 
concurring opinion in Cruzan eschewed the conditional tone of the majority 
opinion.  She wrote that “the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must 
protect, if it protects anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject 
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.”  Cruzan, 497 
U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Some academic commentators have also 
read Cruzan as an indication of where the Court would likely go if pushed.  See, e.g., 
Kadish, supra note 10, at 863 (noting that in Cruzan the Supreme Court “went a good 
distance toward lending its authority to a constitutional right to refuse medical 
treatment”). 
 46. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (addressing the constitutionality of the 
Missouri evidentiary requirement by which an incompetent person’s wishes 
concerning the withdrawal of medical treatment have to be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence).  See also Robertson, supra note 10, at 1148 (noting that “the 
[Cruzan] majority appeared to share the dissent’s and petitioner’s assumptions about 
the right of competent persons to refuse treatment and to issue advance directives 
against treatment when incompetent”).  Moreover, Justice O’Connor again spoke 
with less ambiguity in her concurrence by indicating that a state “may well be 
constitutionally required” to recognize surrogate decision-making for incompetent 
persons in order “to protect the patient’s liberty interest in refusing medical 
treatment.”  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 47. See, e.g., In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 
485, 488 n.4 (Wis. 1997) (noting ambiguity as to the scope of the Supreme Court’s 
holding).  Of course, other state courts have considered the outcome in Cruzan to be 
clear in terms of establishing a federal constitutional right to refuse medical 
treatment.  See, e.g., In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 48. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 754 (Mich. 1994) (Mallett, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (challenging the majority opinion’s 
rejection of a right to assisted suicide because the opinion took the position that 
“because the Cruzan Court merely ‘assumed’ for the purposes of that case that a 
person has a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment such a right may 
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As we know, the Supreme Court eventually decided that the 
Constitution does not afford any protection to such a right, at least 
when that “right” is defined as a general one of all people to have 
assistance in committing suicide.49  My goal here is not to argue about 
whether the Court was correct in its decisions on this point.50  Rather, 
I wish to point out that the constitutional decision-making process in 
the lower courts was affected in at least some respect by the uncertain 
status of the right that was only assumed to exist in Cruzan.  Such a 
distortion in constitutional decision-making in the lower courts 
should be avoided whenever possible. 
A second substantive implication of the Court’s approach in Cruzan 
surfaced in the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Blouin v. Spitzer.51  
The underlying events that led to this case concerned Sheila Pouliot, 
a woman in her early forties who had “suffered profound physical 
and mental disabilities since infancy.”52  After chronically suffering 
from cerebral palsy and a number of other ailments, Ms. Pouliot had 
lost the ability to eat by 1999 and was “acutely ill and, by all accounts, 
near death.”53  Based on her conditions, Ms. Pouliot’s family, her 
medical team, clergy, and a hospital ethics committee decided that 
only palliative care would be provided to Ms. Pouliot and, specifically, 
that the hospital would not administer artificial nutrition, hydration 
or antibiotics.54  It thus appeared that Ms. Pouliot would pass quietly 
away. 
At this point, events took an unexpected turn when the New York 
State Attorney General’s office intervened.  Although the precise 
chain of events is not entirely clear, the Attorney General’s office 
interceded with the hospital administration, pressuring the hospital 
to continue to treat Ms. Pouliot.55  Eventually, the Attorney General 
                                                          
not exist”); Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (rejecting a right to 
physician-assisted suicide in part because “the Court stopped short of actually 
deciding that there is a constitutional right to terminate medical treatment necessary 
to sustain life, although the Court assumed the existence of such a right for the 
purpose of going on to other issues in the case”).  The district court’s resolution of 
this case, while not all of its reasoning, was eventually endorsed by the Supreme 
Court.  Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 49. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702 (concluding that assisted suicide was not a right 
protected by the Due Process Clause); Quill, 521 U.S. at 793 (finding that a statute 
prohibiting assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 50. I do suggest, however, that the “undue burden” standard I advance should 
also apply in the assisted suicide area.  See infra Part IV. 
 51. 356 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 52. Id. at 351. 
 53. Id. at 352. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 353 (noting a factual dispute regarding the authority upon which 
the Attorney General interceded in Ms. Pouliot’s care). 
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took more formal action in the court system with the aim of 
preventing the implementation of the decision to forgo life-
sustaining treatment for Ms. Pouliot.56  The Attorney General’s 
various interventions kept Ms. Pouliot in her near death condition for 
almost three months after the original decision had been made to 
cease her treatment.57  Ms. Pouliot was eventually removed from life-
sustaining equipment and allowed to pass away, but only after a judge 
overruled the State’s objections.58  Before she died, however, Ms. 
Pouliot was forced to endure “treatment” mandated by the state, the 
provision of which her own doctors believed to be unethical and 
“inhumane.”59 
After Ms. Pouliot’s death, Alice Blouin, the administrator of 
Pouliot’s estate, brought an action against the New York State 
Attorney General pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.60  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Blouin’s complaint primarily 
because it agreed that the state officials were entitled to qualified 
immunity.61  A primary reason for upholding this defense was that the 
federal law concerning the right to refuse medical treatment for an 
incompetent adult was unclear, or, in Section 1983 vocabulary, not 
“clearly established.”62  Once again, the Cruzan Court’s reticence to 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 354. 
 57. Id. at 352-56. 
 58. Id. at 355-56. 
 59. The treatment notes of one of Ms. Pouliot’s doctors makes this point vividly: 
[Pouliot’s] gut cannot accept artificial feedings at this point, and her bowel 
sounds remain absent, indicating that her gut is not functioning . . . . Sheila 
is edematous, with total body bloating from hydration in the absence of 
protein.  Hydration alone has resulted in severe protein malnutrition, which 
is typified by skin, peripheral muscle, and cardiac muscle breakdown.  She 
will die a slow and lingering death from protein malnutrition.  From an 
ethical standpoint, I believe this continued treatment, however well 
intentioned, is now inhumane and is causing suffering.  From a medical 
standpoint, it is outside of the bounds of what I consider to be medically 
indicated care. 
Id. at 355 n.4 (ellipses in original). 
 60. Id. at 356.  The statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). 
 61. Blouin, 356 F.3d at 364.  As the court explained, the qualified immunity 
defense “shields a government official acting in an official capacity from suit for 
damages under § 1983 unless the official violated clearly established rights of which 
an objectively reasonable official would have known.”  Id. at 358 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
 62. Id. at 360-61. 
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clearly state the status of the right to refuse medical treatment 
continues to have substantive effects.63 
The preceding discussion was meant to demonstrate, first, that 
while the Court has been less than crystal clear concerning the 
constitutional status of the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, it 
is likely that the Court would affirm that right if forced squarely to 
face the issue.64  As Justice O’Connor noted in her Cruzan 
concurrence, if the Due Process Clause protects anything, it must 
protect an individual’s right to refuse medical treatment.65  In short, it 
seems supportable to assume for purposes of this Article that the 
right is at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
                                                          
 63. One can view the actions of the Florida Legislature in enacting Terri’s Law as 
another instance of a substantive effect of the Court’s approach in Cruzan.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 132-51.  It is difficult to believe that the Florida Legislature 
would have taken the bold step it did if the Supreme Court had firmly identified the 
right to refuse medical treatment as one that is protected as fundamental under the 
Due Process Clause.  For a more in-depth discussion of Terri’s Law with respect to its 
constitutionality under the undue burden standard, see infra Part III.A. 
 64. There has also been discussion concerning the potential implications of the 
Court’s use in Cruzan of the term “liberty interest” as opposed to “right.”  See, e.g., 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814 n.67 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(distinguishing between a liberty interest and a liberty right), rev’d sub nom. 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Morgan et al., supra note 2, at 22 
n.151 (presuming that the Court would subject a liberty interest to a less rigorous test 
than a right); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1131 n.30 (conceding there is a “technical 
difference” between the two terms).  While a full exploration of this issue is well 
beyond the confines of this Article, I do not believe that the “liberty interest” vs. 
“right” issue has a great deal of substantive meaning and relevance.  First, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist seems to use the two terms almost interchangeably.  See Cruzan, 497 
U.S. at 279 (variously describing the refusal of medical treatment as a liberty interest 
and a right).  Second, the use of the term “liberty” appears to be a trend on the 
Court to more closely tie Due Process jurisprudence to the text of the Constitution.  
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning a Texas criminal 
sodomy statute based on the protection of “liberty” as expressed in the Due Process 
Clause); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (basing the decision 
concerning abortion rights on “liberty”).  Decrying the slippage in terminology, 
Justice Souter opined that: 
Our cases have used various terms to refer to fundamental liberty interests, 
and at times we have also called such an interest a “right” even before 
balancing it against the government interest.  Precision in terminology, 
however, favors reserving the label “right” for instances in which the 
individual’s liberty interest actually trumps the government’s countervailing 
interests; only then does the individual have anything legally enforceable as 
against the State’s attempt at regulation. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 768 n.10 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  In any event, whatever the ultimate meaning of the use of 
these terms, for present purposes, the Article will proceed on the basis that there is 
no substantive difference. 
 65. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  But see Morgan et al., 
supra note 2, at 22 n.151 (inferring from Cruzan that the Court likely would not find 
the right to be fundamental, thus implicitly rejecting the import of Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence). 
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and would be found to be so by the Court even given the Court’s 
equivocation on this point.66 
The second point to be taken from this analysis, however, is that 
the failure of the Court to make that right clear in Cruzan has had 
and continues to have serious consequences.  As discussed below, the 
binary nature of fundamental rights jurisprudence has led, in part, to 
the Court’s failure to clearly articulate the right to refuse medical 
treatment.67  Adoption of the undue burden standard should, at the 
very least, ameliorate that concern.  Before moving on to discuss what 
it is about fundamental rights analysis that causes the problem, this 
Article turns to a discussion of the legitimacy of a state interest in the 
preservation of life.  It is the importance of that interest, when 
combined with the importance of the individual right, that causes the 
central problem with which this Article concerns. 
B. The State’s Interest in the Preservation of Human Life 
It seems beyond reasonable dispute that a legitimate and, perhaps, 
primary responsibility of a government is to protect the lives of its 
citizens.68  When courts have been forced to consider cases 
concerning the right to refuse medical treatment, they have almost 
universally identified the preservation and protection of human life 
as one of the legitimate state interests weighing against that right.69  
                                                          
 66. One could also draw support for this proposition from the often quoted 
language from Casey used to support the joint opinion’s reaffirmation of the right of 
a woman to have an abortion: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about 
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under the compulsion of the State. 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.  If these words accurately describe why the abortion right is 
central to “liberty,” it is difficult to see how they would not support the right to 
control one’s own body by refusing medical treatment. 
 67. See infra Part I.C. 
 68. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 n.1 
(Mass. 1986) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (“Maintaining the sanctity of life may well be the 
reason society invests the State with sovereign authority.”); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 
647, 652 n.1 (N.J. 1976) (citing the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitutions of both the United States and the State of New Jersey for the 
proposition that the State’s interest in life “has an undoubted constitutional 
foundation”).  But see Samar, supra note 10, at 261-62 (asserting that the protection of 
individual autonomy is the most important of state interests and that an interest in 
the preservation of life should be subservient to the goal of increasing autonomy). 
 69. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 622-23 (Nev. 1990) (discussing the 
state’s interest as both fundamental and compelling); In re Guardianship of 
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990) (identifying state interests “in the preservation 
of life, the protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and 
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The difficulty has not been in recognizing that the protection of life 
is a valid state goal.  Rather, the challenge has been, and continues to 
be, precisely how to “weigh” that interest against the right to refuse 
medical treatment.  As discussed in the next sub-part, the nature of 
the traditional fundamental rights jurisprudence makes it difficult to 
honor, simultaneously, the state interest and the individual right.70  In 
this sub-part, the Article seeks to underscore the importance of the 
state interest in preserving and protecting life, an interest that in 
constitutional law terminology I would ordinarily deem 
“compelling.”71  The Article also addresses potential objections to, or 
perhaps limitations on, the assertion of the life-protecting rationale. 
In terms of the state’s interest in life, this Article argues that should 
a state decide to take an extreme vitalist position,72 that stance is 
                                                          
maintenance of ethical integrity of the medical profession”); Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 
635-36 (recognizing the state’s broad interest in preserving life); In re Conroy, 486 
A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) (finding that the right to refuse medical treatment is not 
absolute and in some cases must give way to countervailing societal interests); In re 
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 652 n.1 (adding that the state’s interest in the preservation of 
life has constitutional foundations); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)  (acknowledging that the state has an interest in preserving 
life and that the state must balance that interest with the rights of an individual); 
Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(balancing the state interest in the preservation of life against the right of an 
individual to refuse intrusions upon bodily integrity). 
 70. See infra Part I.C (outlining the difficulty with a binary either/or standard of 
review for courts in right to refuse medical treatment cases). 
 71. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the use of the two-tier 
approach in substantive due process cases).  As argued in the concluding section of 
the Article, I do not believe that any undue burden analysis is appropriate in the 
context of “potential” life or the interest at issue in the subject of abortion.  See infra 
Part IV (addressing possible difficulties with an application of the undue burden 
analysis to end-of-life cases).  For now it is sufficient to note that the argument 
advanced here should not be embraced or discarded because it is “anti-abortion.” 
 72. As a policy matter, there are many reasons why a state might very well choose 
to adopt a strong vitalist position.  For example, a state could determine that a 
position strongly in favor of preserving life was necessary to protect vulnerable 
populations such as the elderly, the handicapped, or the young.  See, e.g., Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731-32 (1997) (recognizing the legitimacy of such an 
interest in the context of laws generally prohibiting physician-assisted suicide).  
Similarly, the state could make the policy judgment that moving away from the 
protection of life in any context would lead to the danger of ignoring the value of life 
in other contexts.  In other words, a state might credit the “slippery slope” or 
“Pandora’s Box” argument.  See id. at 733 n.23 (indicating concern over the eventual 
expansion of the right claimed in end-of-life cases).  Of course, these assertions are 
debatable.  See, e.g., Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 10, at 842-47 (rejecting 
slippery slope arguments in this end-of-life subject area).  On the other hand, a state 
might agree with the types of views expressed by Ronald Dworkin, which are more 
complex and nuanced than can be done justice to here, that the sanctity of life 
actually is a reason to allow greater individual decision-making at the end-of-life.  See 
DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 213-17 (rationalizing that the sanctity of life values human 
contribution as well as natural contribution and the court’s denial of euthanasia 
might frustrate the sanctity of life).  The point here is not which position is correct.  
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entitled significant weight in the process of determining whether a 
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment has been infringed.  
This Article does not argue that the extreme vitalist position is 
required of a state or that a court should presume that such a state 
interest exists.  Instead, the proposal set forth below is a means of 
giving the proper respect or deference to an actual state interest 
determined through the appropriate democratic process.  In other 
words, to paraphrase Justice Scalia, I proceed on the basis that life 
really is different.73 
Of course, as with describing the “right to die” itself, there are 
definitional hurdles that arise when one discusses the state’s interest 
in preserving life.  One way to define the issue is what I term the 
“focused interest.”  The focused interest looks to the protection of a 
given individual’s life.  Seen in this way, one can easily imagine how a 
state interest in life would give way to an interest of any individual 
person to refuse unwanted medical treatment.  After all, assuming 
that the person making the choice is rational and not subject to 
coercion or duress, it is difficult to see why the state’s interest in that 
life should trump the individual’s constitutional right.  One can see 
this attitude reflected in court decisions that either hold or suggest in 
one form or another a point made by one judge in dissent:  “The 
State has an interest in preserving the lives of its citizens.  But the 
State’s interest weakens and the individual’s right to privacy grows as 
natural death approaches.”74 
                                                          
Rather, it is that there are reasons a state could take an extreme vitalist position.  For 
an interesting, philosophically-oriented discussion concerning a government’s 
interest in life, see EDWARD W. KEYSERLINGK, SANCTITY OR QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ETHICS, MEDICINE AND LAW (Law Reform Commission of Canada 1979), 
which addresses issues, implications, and assumptions on life-saving treatment 
decisions for terminally ill patients. 
 73. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 557 (2003) (Scalia J., dissenting) 
(mocking the “death is different” jurisprudence concerning capital punishment).    
 74. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 596 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(Wright, J., dissenting).  The Ninth Circuit, en banc, reversed, adopting Judge 
Wright’s position in his panel dissent, Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 
790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702 (1997).  Other courts 
and some dissenting judges have accepted the proposition that the state’s interest in 
life declines as the particular individual’s interest in refusing treatment grows.  See, 
e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 312-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the state’s 
interest in relation to the severity of the patient’s medical condition); In re Conroy, 
486 A.2d at 1224 (suggesting the value of life may be reduced rather than enhanced 
by not allowing an individual free choice and self-determination); Compassion in 
Dying, 79 F.3d at 817, 820 (adding that the strength of the state’s interest is 
dependent on circumstances including the patient’s wishes and medical condition), 
overruled by Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702 (1997); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729-30 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (restating that New York’s prohibition on assisted suicide bears a rational 
relation to a legitimate end), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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There is, however, another way to view the matter:  the 
“comprehensive interest” in life.  In the comprehensive interest, the 
state is concerned not only with protecting a given individual’s life 
but also with the best means to preserve and protect life over society 
viewed as a whole.75  It appears that the Supreme Court essentially has 
accepted that a state may assert the comprehensive interest in life 
when opposing an individual’s exercise of a constitutional right to 
refuse medical treatment,76 but that state courts have overwhelming 
rejected it.77  In any event, it is when we define the state’s interest in 
                                                          
 75. It may seem that what I have termed a comprehensive interest in life is simply 
a utilitarian view.  In other words, one might think of it as a view in which the 
operating principle is that the “good of the many is placed before the good of [the] 
one.”  See Keith D. Kilback, To Be Human:  Selective Reflections on the Sanctity of Life in 
Rodriguez, 2 HEALTH L.J. 39, 56 (1994) (criticizing the sanctity of life approach as a 
justification for protecting the vulnerable under a utilitarian theory).  There is 
academic debate as to whether such a utilitarian view should be adopted at the 
expense of a focus on individual autonomy.  Id. at 54-57; Linda R. Hirshman, Topics 
in Jurisprudence:  The Philosophy of Personal Identity and the Life and Death Cases, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 91, 97-99 (1992) (discounting utilitarian protection of a patient where 
the patient is unable to feel pain, unable to experience future pleasure, and lacks 
conscious experience of personhood beyond the body).  I am not convinced that the 
comprehensive view is necessarily utilitarian.  For example, consider a situation in 
which slightly more than half of the citizens in a state would “benefit” from a right to 
refuse treatment considered individually.  In such a situation—perhaps when a 
majority of the population is elderly—it would not be utilitarian for the state to assert 
a comprehensive interest in life; yet, I contend that it would still be a valid policy 
choice for the state to do so.  Moreover, for the reasons I describe in the text, that 
policy choice would still be worthy of enhanced protection even though it was not 
strictly individualistic or utilitarian.  It would have been the state’s policy choice 
adopted via whatever is the operative political process. 
 76. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 (“Finally, we think a State may properly decline to 
make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and 
simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed 
against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.”).  Some 
commentators have rejected the notion that the state’s assertion of what I have 
termed the comprehensive interest in life should be viewed in any meaningfully 
different way than the focused interest.  See, e.g., Cantor, A Patient’s Decision to Decline 
Life-Saving Medical Treatment:  Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 228, 243-45 (1973) (noting the complications with the preservation of life 
where a competent person resists medical treatment). 
 77. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 74 (Wis. 1992) 
(reiterating that at a certain point the patient’s liberty in refusing treatment prevails 
over state interests in preserving life); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 
14 (Fla. 1990) (distinguishing the state’s interest in preservation of life where the 
patient’s condition is not curable); In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 
(Wash. 1987) (advancing the argument that where the terminally ill patient’s 
treatment is significantly intrusive, the patient’s right to refuse treatment prevails 
over the state’s interest); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 
635 n.28 (Mass. 1986) (noting the state’s interest carries less weight with the 
incapacitation and suffering of the patient); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223 
(expanding the preservation of life interest into related concerns of preserving the 
life of the patient and preserving the sanctity of all life); Superintendent of 
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (Mass. 1977) 
(reconciling the state interest in preserving life with the interest of an individual to 
refuse prolongation where the cost to the patient is great); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 
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life comprehensively that problems develop under the traditional 
constitutional balancing mechanism. 
Before moving to a consideration of that mechanism, I will address 
what some readers might be thinking:  Couldn’t the state be insincere 
in asserting the comprehensive version of an interest in the 
preservation of life?  This question actually raises two distinct points.  
First, the state could be asserting the comprehensive interest in life 
merely as a pretext to justify its action infringing upon the right at 
issue.  While dealing with such a pretextual situation is not simple, 
the Article has attempted to craft a balancing mechanism to address 
this possibility by including in the calculus a consideration of the 
purposes of the law causing the infringement.78 
The more difficult type of insincerity occurs in situations in which 
the state is not using its action as a pretext for accomplishing some 
other, improper goal, but rather when its profession of a 
comprehensive interest in life is undermined by other state actions or 
policies.  For example, consider a situation in which a state articulates 
a comprehensive interest in life but also provides for and carries out 
capital punishment.  Does the imposition of the death penalty mean 
that a court should—or must—disregard the state’s asserted 
comprehensive interest in the preservation of life?  This question is a 
far more challenging one with which to deal.  One would be tempted 
to use such an apparent inconsistency as a basis to ignore the state’s 
more comprehensive assertion that it is protecting all life.  I 
ultimately conclude, however, that to do so would be inconsistent 
with a premise upon which the argument is based.  That is, in the 
arena of life and death, a state should have significant leeway to 
proclaim an interest in life.  A corollary to that position is that—
within constitutional bounds79—a state may take the policy position 
that all life is valuable except the lives of those persons who have 
committed a particularly heinous crime.  A state would be taking 
                                                          
647, 663-64 (N.J. 1976) (approving a parental request for termination of life support 
and finding that an individual’s rights overcome the state’s interest where the 
patient’s prognosis is extremely poor); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 
304-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (granting patient’s request for removal of life support); 
In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing 
the parents to exercise the substituted judgment for their minor child).  But see 
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419-20 (Mo. 1988) (accepting a more 
comprehensive view of state interest in the preservation of life), aff’d sub nom. Cruzan 
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 78. See infra Part II.B (discussing the “purpose” prong of my proposed undue 
burden analysis). 
 79. I thus leave aside the forceful arguments that the imposition of the death 
penalty itself is a violation of the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
ALLEN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 10/3/2004  5:52 PM 
992 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:971 
what amounts to a “qualified comprehensive” view in terms of the 
protection of life.  Thus, while acknowledging the inconsistency in a 
state’s argument that it is in favor of preserving life when that state 
itself kills, the Article does not suggest that this inconsistency should 
be a basis to disqualify or lessen that state’s broadly defined interest 
in preserving life. 
Having addressed the individual right and the state interest, the 
Article turns to a consideration of relevant background principles of 
constitutional law.  Through this section one may appreciate the 
difficult position in which a court is placed when attempting to 
balance the two critical interests at stake in end-of-life cases. 
C. Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence and its Inadequacies to Address the 
Constitutional Right to Refuse Treatment and the State Interest in Life 
It is a familiar part of constitutional law that courts evaluate 
substantive due process claims using a two-tier standard.80  If a right is 
deemed “fundamental,”81 the Due Process Clause prevents 
government action infringing upon that right “unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
                                                          
 80. There are commentators who have argued that, as a descriptive matter, the 
Court may actually employ a standard more akin to a sliding scale in substantive due 
process cases.  See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed:  The Role of 
Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994) (arguing 
that the Court has long applied an ad hoc approach in substantive due process cases 
in which the nature of the infringement of the right makes a substantial difference in 
an analysis of whether such an infringement is a violation of the Constitution); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 314 (1993) (arguing that the Court 
gives “the impression” of using a two-tier process when in reality the process is more 
complex); ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 71, § 18.3, at 225 (3d ed. 1999) (“The 
Supreme Court has come close to stating that, in fundamental rights cases, it will use 
a balancing test or an intermediate form of review that would require the 
government to demonstrate that the restriction on the fundamental right was 
substantially related to an important interest,” but continues to note that the Court 
has been “unclear” as to how such a standard would operate).  The Court, for its part 
however, has consistently articulated the basic two-tier standard described in the text 
as the means of evaluating a substantive due process claim, whether or not it could 
be considered to have deviated from that standard in certain situations.  See, e.g., 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (holding that the right to 
assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (describing the standard for finding 
fundamental interests and advocating self-restraint in expansion of this area). 
 81. The Court has used various formulations to define what constitutes a 
“fundamental” right.  For example, in discussing the issue in Glucksberg, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, combined several such formulations when he 
described fundamental rights as those that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”  521 U.S. at 720-21 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
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interest.”82  Under this tier of review—strict scrutiny—the individual 
right at issue is given a form of heightened protection against 
infringement because a court requires a stronger justification for 
government action.  Correspondingly, decisions made in the 
democratic process are more likely to be overturned at this higher 
level of review precisely because the court engages in a more 
searching review of the state’s purposes and the means chosen to 
achieve such purposes.83 
The other tier of review for substantive due process claims is often 
termed rationality review.  Within this tier, if a right is not deemed 
fundamental, government action infringing upon that right (if one 
can still employ the term) will be sustained so long as the action is 
“rationally related to legitimate government interests.”84  Acting as a 
mirror image of the situation under strict scrutiny, an individual right 
or interest is more at risk of being infringed upon in rationality 
review because of the deferential nature of a court’s review.  A state’s 
interests, as reflected in political decisions, are correspondingly more 
likely to be sustained because of that deference.85 
Thus, one can view traditional substantive due process analysis as 
being essentially binary in nature.  A classification of a right as 
fundamental will, for all intents and purposes, protect that right from 
infringement, but it will do so at the cost of trumping a state 
interest.86  The binary nature of the process presents courts with a 
particularly difficult challenge in the context of the right to refuse 
medical treatment.  In this situation, a court must deal with an 
infringement of an incredibly powerful individual interest, one that 
Justice O’Connor has indicated is at the heart of due process 
                                                          
 82. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.  Other than my brief comments earlier, I leave aside 
for purposes of this Article whether there is a difference in the standard depending 
on whether a court characterizes something as a “fundamental right” or a “liberty 
interest.”  See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1131 n.30 (noting the possibility that such 
difference in terminology could affect the appropriate level of constitutional review); 
Robertson, supra note 10, at 1172-74 (suggesting that by avoiding the fundamental 
right language and instead using liberty interest terminology, the Court may allow 
greater deference to state regulation). 
 83. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“By extending constitutional protection 
to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside 
the arena of public debate and legislative action.”). 
 84. Id. at 728. 
 85. See, e.g., ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 71, §§ 15.4, 18.3 (discussing 
substantive due process, equal protection, and the various standards of review). 
 86. It is true as Justice O’Connor has noted in another context that strict scrutiny 
is not “strict in theory but fatal in fact.”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 
(2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).  The 
reality is, however, that the strict scrutiny standard is designed to, and does, make it 
exceedingly difficult for a state to justify the infringement of a fundamental right. 
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protection itself.87  On the other side of the ledger, however, is a state 
interest that is also powerful:  preserving and protecting life both on 
an individual and on a society-wide basis.88  The problem is that the 
very nature of substantive due process analysis makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to simultaneously honor both interests.  If the right is 
honored and deemed “fundamental,” a state may only justify an 
infringement upon the right if it has a compelling state interest.  But 
if the state’s democratically arrived-at choice to protect life is 
honored and deemed a compelling interest, the infringement upon 
the right usually will be allowed under the Constitution.89  Thus, 
traditional analysis is unsatisfying in this context because it puts a 
court to somewhat of an either/or choice:  either it protects the 
individual right to refuse unwanted medical treatment or it protects 
the government interest in preserving life.  This Article addresses this 
unsatisfying choice by providing an alternative method for analyzing 
the situation. 
One objection to the point articulated about the “unsatisfying” 
nature of substantive due process analysis in the right to die area is 
that this concern is applicable to the constitutional adjudication of all 
due process claims.  That is, for every individual right and every state 
interest, a court must make choices leading to one side or the other 
losing out.  Indeed, that is at some level the point of the balancing of 
right and interest.  But this type of criticism is really addressed to the 
entire notion of two-tier review of substantive due process claims.90  
The Article does not attack the efficacy of the traditional two-tier 
review as a general matter of constitutional jurisprudence; indeed, an 
assumption on which the Article proceeds is that such review is 
usually the appropriate standard principally because it provides a 
                                                          
 87. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  See also supra Part I.A (reviewing the constitutional status of a patient’s 
right to refuse medical treatment). 
 88. See supra Part I.B (noting the challenge of a state’s interest in preserving life 
as weighed against the individual’s right to refuse medical treatment). 
 89. It is also true that in addition to having a compelling interest the 
government’s action must be narrowly tailored to achieving that interest.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 80-82 (observing the complexity of the standard of review 
for substantive due process claims).  This additional requirement, however, does not 
significantly lessen the point being made.  Its addition to the mix only means that the 
right will be trumped in most but not all cases.  The key still remains that finding life 
to be a compelling interest would greatly reduce the protection of the right across 
the population. 
 90. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004) 
(arguing that judicial interpretation has largely skewed the general scheme of the 
Constitution); Peter Preiser, Rediscovering A Coherent Rational for Substantive Due 
Process, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the anomaly of a two-tier approach and 
advocating for a detailed analysis of the relationship between the government’s 
interest and the restriction of liberty). 
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high degree of protection to fundamental rights.91  Rather, the Article 
contends that there is something unique about the situation in which 
the right to refuse medical treatment is pitted against a state interest 
in preserving life.  Choices about life are fundamentally different in 
my view than choices about most other things.  Here, we are faced 
with choices about life on both sides of the equation.  Thus, the 
contest of life versus life is, in some sense, sui generis and deserves a 
standard of review that recognizes that fact.92  In the next part, the 
Article describes a proposed standard for that purpose. 
II. AN “UNDUE BURDEN” STANDARD AS THE APPROPRIATE MEANS TO 
BALANCE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT AND THE 
STATE’S INTEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE 
The Supreme Court should adopt a standard for balancing the 
individual right to refuse medical treatment against state action 
infringing upon that right as follows:  a court should strike down any 
governmental action that (a) has the effect of creating a substantial 
obstacle to an individual’s exercise of her right to refuse medical 
treatment or (b) has the primary purpose of creating an obstacle 
(whether substantial or otherwise) in the exercise of the right instead 
of advancing the state’s interest in the protection and preservation of 
life.  The proposed standard has its genesis in the joint opinion of 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.93  As explained in this Part, this 
                                                          
 91. See supra note 80 (suggesting that substantive due process cases involve more 
than discrete tiers of scrutiny). 
 92. I return in my concluding comments to the question of whether the undue 
burden standard advocated should be expanded to areas beyond the right to die.  See 
infra Part IV (limiting the application of the undue burden test).  The undue burden 
standard should be reserved only for those situations in which, essentially, life and 
death are pitted against one another.  Indeed, I suggest that the standard should not 
be applicable to the situations in which it is currently used—infringements on the 
ability to have a pre-viability abortion—because the state interest at issue there is the 
preservation of potential life, an interest that should not be sufficient to warrant a 
movement away from the traditional means of evaluating infringement on 
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause. 
 93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  There is some precedent for using a form of undue 
burden analysis in end-of-life matters.  For example, certain state and federal trial 
courts considering the constitutionality of bans on physician-assisted suicide 
concluded that the Casey undue burden standard was applicable to those challenges.  
See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-63 (W.D. 
Wash. 1994) (analogizing precedent where similar issues of intimate and personal 
choice and the right to be free from governmental intrusion are present), rev’d by 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., No. 93-
306-178 CZ, 1993 WL 276833, at *9 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 20, 1993) (articulating the 
application of the Casey undue burden test where the fundamental right to bodily 
integrity is at issue), rev’d by People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).  
Ultimately, both these opinions were reversed on the principal ground that there was 
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Article’s articulation of the standard has some significant differences 
from the one employed in Casey.94  In addition to contrasting these 
two undue burden standards, the Article will also explain in detail 
                                                          
no right to physician-assisted suicide.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702 (reversing 
Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1454); Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 714 (reversing 
Hobbins, 1993 WL 276833).  Thus, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the 
Michigan Supreme Court considered whether the Casey undue burden standard 
should apply to the claims.  See also Valerie J. Pacer, Comment, Salvaging the Undue 
Burden Standard—Is it a Lost Cause?  The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights 
Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 328-31 (1995) (arguing that a modified undue 
burden standard should be applied on a broader basis in constitutional law and 
using as an example the Supreme Court decision of Cruzan). 
In addition, at least one court prior to Casey used undue burden language in 
evaluating a right to die claim.  In In re Jobes, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
considered the appropriate standards for allowing the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
medical treatment “from a non-elderly nursing home patient in a persistent 
vegetative state who, prior to her incompetency, failed to express adequately her 
attitude toward such [life-sustaining] treatment.”  529 A.2d 434, 436 (N.J. 1987).  At 
one point in its opinion, the court stated that the procedures it had developed 
“adequately protect patients, without unduly burdening their rights to self-determination 
and privacy.”  Id. at 451 (emphasis added).  Taken as a whole, however, it does not 
appear that the court was actually advocating a substantively different constitutional 
standard by using this particular language.  If the court was attempting to adopt a 
hitherto unused standard, it certainly did so with little analysis.  In re Jobes, 529 A.2d at 
434. 
 94. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  The joint opinion articulated its undue burden 
standard as follows: 
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.  A statute with this 
purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the 
interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free 
choice, not hinder it.  And a statute which, while furthering the interest in 
potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a 
permissible means of serving its legitimate ends. 
Id. at 877. 
The 1992 Supreme Court opinion in Casey drew substantial public and academic 
comment because, as one writer noted, “[t]he lead opinion is so fractured that, as 
the maze of concurrences and dissents illustrate, there is something in it for 
everyone to hate.”  Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law:  Liberty, Equality, and the New 
Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 80 (1995).  I will 
address certain criticisms of the Casey undue burden standard as part of my 
explanation and defense of my articulation of the standard in this Part of the Article. 
It is also true that the Court has employed standards that are similar to an undue 
burden analysis in other areas of constitutional law.  See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 
80, at 893-908 (discussing what the author views as undue burden analysis used by the 
Court in a number of constitutional cases); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on 
Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1219, 1235-39 (1996) (discussing use of 
what Professor Dorf considers to be a form of undue burden analysis in evaluating 
claims of an incidental burden on the exercise of fundamental rights).  Whatever the 
pedigree of undue burden analysis in constitutional law as a whole, it does seem that 
the use of such a standard specifically with respect to substantive due process claims 
concerning so-called unenumerated rights, or at least direct burdens on those rights, 
was largely a creation of the Casey joint opinion.  See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 965, 987-
88 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (raising criticism of 
the joint opinion because the undue burden standard purportedly did not have a 
strong pedigree in constitutional jurisprudence). 
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how the standard advocated would work, discuss the theoretical 
concepts that support it, and identify and address difficulties one 
might expect to encounter in applying the standard.  I continue this 
effort in Part III in which the Article further explores the standard by 
applying it to three examples of government infringements of an 
individual’s right to decline medical treatment. 
Before moving on to address these various matters, however, I want 
to underscore an important feature of the underpinning for the 
concept of the standard I propose.  One reaches the undue burden 
standard only after having concluded that the right at issue is 
fundamental and the state interest in life is deserving of special 
consideration.  Thus, while it appears to be a form of intermediate 
scrutiny,95 and perhaps operates in some respects in a manner similar 
to intermediate scrutiny, it is different theoretically.96  The standard is 
a balancing device that one reaches not by “devaluing” a right as one 
might say occurs when, for example, gender-based classifications are 
subjected to intermediate scrutiny under equal protection analysis.97  
Instead, the standard is a means to try to reconcile two 
extraordinarily important interests in a way that, in the long run, best 
secures both.98  Such a situation is difficult to categorize in traditional 
                                                          
 95. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 513, 532-33 (1996) (describing 
intermediate scrutiny with respect to gender classifications).  Such classifications can 
only survive judicial review if they both further “important governmental objectives” 
and are “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”  Id. at 533. 
 96. Under classically defined equal protection intermediate scrutiny, for the law 
at issue to be sustained, the government must “demonstrate that the classification has 
a substantial relationship to an important interest.”  See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra 
note 71, § 15.4 (observing that intermediate level scrutiny requires less than the 
compelling interest required with strict scrutiny but more than the great deference 
to the legislature with rational basis review).  Some commentators have described the 
Casey undue burden standard as a form of intermediate scrutiny.  See, e.g., Jon S. 
Lerner, Comment, Protecting Home Schooling through the Casey Undue Burden Standard, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 364 (1995) (exploring the reasoning and application of the 
undue burden standard to home schooling regulations).  Additionally, one 
commentator advocating a broader use of intermediate scrutiny in constitutional law 
has suggested that the Court use such scrutiny when judging issues concerning 
physician-assisted suicide.  See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way:  Intermediate 
Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 349-50 (1998) (defining 
intermediate scrutiny as including gender discrimination and commercial speech 
and discussing its application to affirmative action).  This Article later suggests that 
physician-assisted suicide claims, as part of the larger “right to die” constellation, 
should be judged by the undue burden standard.  See infra Part IV (advancing an 
undue burden standard and discussing implications). 
 97. See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 71, § 18.20 (providing an overview 
of scrutiny of gender-based classifications). 
 98. It is for this reason that my proposed standard should not be expanded 
beyond the right to die, broadly defined.  See infra Part IV (acknowledging that 
adopting an undue burden standard may reduce the protection of a fundamental 
right).  Indeed, I suggest that the similar Casey standard should be abandoned 
because the prerequisite of a uniquely important state interest is absent. 
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terms, but that is a result of the difficulty inherent in trying to respect 
both the right to refuse medical treatment and the state interest in 
the preservation of life.99 
A. The Procedure for Applying the Undue Burden Standard 
Having explored the foundation for the undue burden standard, 
this sub-part discusses the procedural steps by which a court would 
apply it.  The initial burden would fall on the individual to establish, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given state action 
infringes upon the individual’s right to refuse medical treatment.  If 
there were no infringement, there would be, by definition, no 
violation of the right.100 
Assuming that the individual carried her burden of demonstrating 
an infringement of the right, the law at issue would be presumptively 
invalid.  To sustain the law, the state would have the burden to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the law did not 
have the effect of creating a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the 
right to refuse medical treatment and (2) the primary purpose of the 
law was the advancement of the state’s interest in preserving and 
protecting life and not merely the creation of an obstacle (whether 
substantial or otherwise) to the exercise of the right for its own sake.  
If the state carried its burdens in this regard, the law at issue would be 
sustained.101  If it failed in either of the prongs of the analysis, the 
individual would prevail and the law would be voided as to that 
person.102 
                                                          
 99. My colleague Professor Tom Marks has argued that the Casey standard is not 
truly concerned with balancing but rather more accurately represents merely a 
definitional exercise in that the manner in which a court defines the burden will 
dictate the result.  Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Three Ring Circus Six Years Later, 25 STETSON 
L. REV. 81, 111-13 (1995).  Whether or not Professor Marks is correct about the Casey 
standard, as I have explained in the text, the standard I advocate is applicable only 
after balancing the state interest and the individual right and concluding that the 
traditional substantive due process analysis does not allow for both of these valuable 
commodities to be given the respect they each deserve. 
 100. See Brownstein, supra note 80, at 867 (noting that the “conventional 
understanding of fundamental rights” jurisprudence includes a determination of 
“whether the right has been infringed”). 
 101. As a technical matter, the law at issue would still need to pass rationality 
review.  Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (concluding that 
right to physician-assisted suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest but 
observing that “[t]he Constitution also requires, however, that [the state law at issue] 
be rationally related to legitimate government interests.”).  As a practical matter, if a 
given law does not fall under the undue burden standard with its consideration of 
both purpose and, through the effect prong, means, it will not fall under the less 
stringent rational basis test.  See Brownstein, supra note 80, at 881 (commenting that 
the Casey standard “subsumes the application of the rational basis standard review to 
regulations that do not impose undue burdens”). 
 102. Solely to simplify matters for purposes of this Article, I will assume that the 
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The Article will describe the substantive contours of both the effect 
and purpose prongs of the analysis below.103  Before doing so, 
however, there are additional points that should be made or 
reiterated that concern the level of protection to be afforded to the 
individual right to refuse medical treatment.  First a reiteration:  the 
adoption of the undue burden analysis suggested does not mean that 
the right is no longer “fundamental.”104  Rather, the standard is 
designed as a means to best balance two competing interests, both of 
which are deserving of the highest possible degree of protection.  It is 
a compromise standard in the one area in which this fundamental 
right is pitted against the state’s compelling interest in life.105  There is 
                                                          
individual is making only an “as applied” as opposed to a facial challenge to the state 
law.  There has been debate in the courts and the academic literature in the 
abortion-regulation area as to whether the Casey undue burden standard is applicable 
in a facial challenge or is restricted to those made only on an “as applied basis.”  See, 
e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 n.24 (1997) 
(holding that the Washington ban on assisted suicide does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment facially or “as applied” to competent, terminally ill adults); John 
Christopher Ford, Comment, The Casey Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on 
Abortion Statutes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443 (1997) (suggesting the overbreadth doctrine 
is more appropriate to abortion cases than previous tests); Sandra Lynne Tholen & 
Lisa Baird, Note & Comment, Con Law Is As Con Law Does:  A Survey of Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 992-95 
(1995) (discussing the facial challenge test established in United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739 (1987), where a regulation is facially invalid if under “no set of 
circumstances” would the law be valid).  I do not believe that the difference between 
these types of challenges should be germane to the arguments I advance. 
 103. See infra Parts II.B and II.C (describing further the “effect” and “purpose” 
prongs of the undue burden standard I propose to infringements on the right to 
refuse medical treatment). 
 104. A major criticism of the Court’s decision in Casey was that the right to have a 
pre-viability abortion that had been deemed fundamental in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973), was essentially rendered non-fundamental through the operation of the 
undue burden standard.  See, e.g., Annette E. Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper of 
Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 321 n.278 (1993) (implying that the undue burden 
standard in Casey involves less than strict scrutiny analysis and that Casey questions the 
holding in Roe that the right to terminate a pregnancy is a fundamental right); C. 
Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe’d to Confusion:  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1457, 1488 (1993) (adding that although the Casey Court did not overrule 
Roe’s fundamental right to an abortion, the Court did not protect the right from 
further regulation); Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey:  Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 
TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (1993) (finding that Casey rejected the strict scrutiny 
standard adopted in Roe and instead applied the less demanding undue burden test); 
Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey:  The Flight from Reason in the 
Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 20 n.30 (1993) (questioning whether, 
after Casey, there is a fundamental right to an abortion and observing the difficulty of 
weighing competing interests without a useful guide); Nadine Strossen & Ronald 
K.L. Collins, The Future of an Illusion:  Reconstituting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 16 
CONST. COMMENT. 587, 588 (1999) (flouting the redefinition of the fundamental 
right and strict scrutiny in Roe to the deferential undue burden standard in Casey). 
 105. See infra Part IV (discussing how the undue burden standard should be 
reserved for only those cases in which the state interest is the preservation or 
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no doubt that more instances of infringement of this right will be 
allowed than under the standard strict scrutiny calculus, assuming 
that the interest in life was deemed compelling.106  But simply because 
this balancing is slightly different than traditional balancing in strict 
scrutiny does not mean that the right at issue has been devalued.  
Instead, the standard reflects an attempt to continue to value that 
right without undervaluing the state interest in life.107 
Second, and related to the preceding point, the undue burden 
standard is not a means to reach strict scrutiny.  It is a balancing 
mechanism to be used in place of traditional strict scrutiny analysis.  
Some commentators addressing the Casey standard have suggested 
that a court would essentially determine whether there is an undue 
burden and, if there was, proceed to address whether there was a 
compelling state interest for the state action and whether the action 
was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.108  Such an approach 
would not sufficiently address the concerns this Article raises. 
To begin with, under this reading of the standard, if one 
determined that there was an undue burden, the remaining issue 
would be how to balance properly an interest in preserving life with 
the right to refuse medical treatment.  Thus, the problem of how to 
best balance the state interest in life and the individual right would 
not actually be addressed.  Rather, it would merely be delayed.  
Moreover, the addition of this preliminary step in the strict scrutiny 
analysis would present the danger that infringement on fundamental 
                                                          
protection of existing human life).  This restriction should deal with alarms raised 
that by adopting the Casey undue burden standard to address pre-viability abortion 
regulations, the Court was endangering all fundamental rights.  See, e.g., Casey, 505 
U.S. at 987-88 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (insisting that the 
joint opinion was wrong in applying the undue burden standard to a law that 
“directly regulates” a fundamental right).  That concern is certainly legitimate.  It is 
precisely the desire to avoid undermining the traditional protection accorded 
fundamental rights while simultaneously attempting to acknowledge the uniquely 
important place the protection of life has in our culture that drove me to make the 
proposal advanced in this Article. 
 106. See supra Part I.C (discussing fundamental rights jurisprudence and its 
inadequacies in dealing with right to die situations). 
 107. See id. (emphasizing that strict scrutiny involves balancing between the right 
to die and the state’s interest in protecting life). 
 108. See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the Current Supreme 
Court:  The Joint Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 649 n.42 (2002) 
(discussing how the Court has applied the undue burden standard in other 
situations, such as the right to marry and the right to travel); Lerner, supra note 96, 
at 368 (defining the undue burden standard as “a threshold inquiry designed to 
establish whether the rational basis or strict scrutiny standard should be applied to a 
particular regulation”).  But see Brownstein, supra note 80, at 879 (“Instead of using 
the ‘undue burden’ test as a threshold inquiry to determine the appropriate 
standard of review to apply, the Casey plurality utilizes the undue burden test itself as 
an independent standard of review.”). 
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rights might be allowed without the state ever being put to the test of 
having a compelling interest for engaging in the infringing conduct 
in the first place.109  Under my proposal, one only gets to the undue 
burden analysis after having concluded that there is a sufficiently 
powerful state interest—the preservation of life—that is in opposition 
to the fundamental individual right to refuse treatment. 
Third, I recognize that it is rare—although not unheard of—to 
impose a burden that is akin to proving a negative on a party,110 as I 
do by requiring the state to demonstrate that its actions do not have 
the effect of creating a substantial obstacle to the exercise of an 
individual’s right to refuse medical treatment.111  The burden is 
allocated in this way to provide a measure of increased protection for 
the right in a standard that, concededly, provides less protection than 
strict scrutiny would likely provide.  The assignments of burdens of 
                                                          
 109. For example, assume that a given state action claimed to have infringed on a 
fundamental right occurred for a legitimate, although not compelling reason.  
Further assume that the effect of that action was to create an obstacle—although not 
a “substantial” one—to the exercise of the fundamental right at issue.  In this case, 
under the Casey standard there would be no undue burden and, therefore, no need 
to engage in the strict scrutiny calculus, even though there most certainly was an 
infringement of a fundamental right. 
 110. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 11 (1976) 
(discussing certain provisions of federal legislation that presumed black lung disease 
in miners was caused by their working conditions and, accordingly, placed the 
burden on the mine operators to prove that mine work was not the cause); Chase 
Manhattan Bank v. O’Connor, 197 A.2d 706, 709 (N.J. 1964) (declaring that 
generally, where a party’s case rests on proving a negative—such as non-delivery of a 
document—the burden of proof is on the party alleging the negative).  Moreover, 
the claim that a party is forced to prove a negative is, at some level, misleading 
because almost all affirmative statements can be reformulated as negative ones.  See, 
e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE DOCTRINE 
AND PRACTICE § 3.1, at 177 n.12 (1995) (suggesting that most positive “propositions” 
can be reworded as negatives); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 412 (John W. 
Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE] (clarifying 
the assignment of the burden of proof when an averment is negative). 
 111. See supra Part II.A.  My placement of the burden in this regard is another 
example of how my proposal differs from the Casey standard.  In Casey, it appears that 
the burden fell on the challenger to affirmatively demonstrate that there was an 
undue burden under either the purpose or effect prong of the test.  See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 990-91 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (collecting examples from joint opinion indicating that the 
record did not demonstrate that there was an undue burden).  The placement of the 
burden on the challenger in Casey has also been the subject of academic criticism.  
See, e.g., Howard, supra note 104, at 1486 (insisting that Casey alters the “nature of the 
right” in the way that it applies the burden of proof); Kolbert & Gans, supra note 104, 
at 1155 (suggesting that the Court in Casey created a higher burden of proof for 
challengers to abortion regulations than Roe had originally set forth).  There are, 
however, academic commentators who have argued that the Casey Court placed the 
burden on the government in the undue burden analysis.  See, e.g., David L. Faigman, 
Madisonian Balancing:  A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 
688-89 (1994) (reviewing the holding in Casey and charging that the joint opinion 
placed the burden of proof on the government, at least with respect to showing that 
spousal notification would not amount to a substantial obstacle). 
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production and persuasion are, in many respects, means of 
implementing more substantive policy goals.112  Thus, the assignment 
of the burden I propose reinforces the importance of the individual 
right at stake, even while the standard as a whole seeks also to protect 
the state’s interest in preserving life. 
Having now canvassed the procedure by which the undue burden 
standard would be applied, this Article will turn in the following two 
sub-parts to a consideration of the separate prongs of the analysis, 
those concerning the effect of the government action and the 
government’s purpose for acting.  The exploration of the contours of 
these prongs continues in Part III which applies the proposed 
standard in three situations and raises a range of issues. 
B. The “Effects” Prong of the Undue Burden Standard 
Under the effects prong of the undue burden analysis, a law that 
has the effect of creating a substantial obstacle to an individual’s 
exercising the right to refuse medical treatment would be invalid.  
The effects prong is the principal means under my proposal by which 
an individual’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is to be 
protected.113  Under the burden structure described above, the state 
would have the burden to establish that the law at issue did not have 
the prohibited effect.  Recall that the individual has the initial 
burden to demonstrate that a given law caused an infringement upon 
the right to refuse medical treatment.114  Thus, by the time a court is 
required to consider the effects prong of the analysis it has already 
been established that there is an “obstacle” to the exercise of the 
right.  The issue will almost certainly turn on whether that obstacle is 
“substantial.”  That inquiry will in turn require a court to consider all 
of the facts and circumstances of that individual case.  What is a 
                                                          
 112. See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 110, § 3.1, at 177 (“First and 
perhaps most important, burdens are allocated to serve substantive policy, making it 
easier or harder for plaintiffs to recover or defendants to avoid liability.”); cf. Cruzan 
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (commenting that “not only 
does the standard of proof reflect the importance of a particular adjudication, it also 
serves as a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed 
between the litigants”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  See also Faigman, 
supra note 111, at 658-60, 665-70 (advocating the use of shifting burdens as part of a 
theory of constitutional adjudication). 
 113. As I discuss below, while also protecting the right, the purpose prong 
additionally serves another important goal.  See infra Part II.C (explaining that the 
second goal of the purpose prong is to police state actions). 
 114. See supra Part II.A (describing shifting burdens and asserting that the law is 
presumptively invalid if the individual has demonstrated an infringement of the 
right). 
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“substantial” obstacle in one situation might very well not be deemed 
“substantial” in another.115 
Describing the central inquiry under the effects prong raises one of 
the principal criticisms leveled at the Casey standard:  It is too 
amorphous and does not provide judges with sufficient guidance.116  
There is no question that the standard—both as articulated in Casey 
and in this Article—provides judges with discretion and flexibility in 
determining what constitutes a “substantial” obstacle.  But such 
flexibility is inherent whenever a test is based on a standard instead of 
a bright-line rule.  A full exploration of the rules versus standards 
debate in terms of judicial decision-making is well beyond the scope 
of this Article.117  The key point at present is that a standard allowing 
courts to consider a variety of facts and circumstances—as is 
contemplated by the undue burden standard—is important precisely 
so that a decision-maker can evaluate a claim of undue burden in the 
context in which it is made.  Over time, a body of law will develop 
that will provide guidance to litigants and later courts, while still 
allowing a judge to exercise discretion to evaluate a new situation.  
Moreover, flexibility is needed in this situation in order to help 
ameliorate the formalistic nature of traditional two-tier substantive 
due process analysis.  Thus, my response to the basic criticism that 
                                                          
 115. See infra Part III (exploring this concept further by way of a discussion of how 
the proposed standard would work in three factual scenarios). 
 116. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 965 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that the undue burden standard will produce numerous 
“conflicting views”); id. at 985-91 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stating that the undue burden standard is amorphous and inconsistently 
applied); Clark, supra note 104, at 326 (explaining that “[a]t present, the undue 
burden standard appears arbitrary because there is no reasoned basis for the results 
the joint opinion [in Casey] would ascribe to it”); Linton, supra note 104, at 69-72 
(arguing that the undue burden standard can never be applied evenly); Marks, supra 
note 99, at 113 (questioning whether the joint opinion in Casey actually applied a 
balancing of interests method or simply used a “fact driven definition” to determine 
whether something is an undue burden); Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the 
Undue Burden Standard:  Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2025, 2027 (1994) (claiming that in Casey “the joint opinion’s failure to provide 
a systematic methodology by which to apply the standard undermines the standard’s 
force”). 
 117. There is a vast amount of literature on the debate both as it pertains to 
constitutional adjudication as well as more broadly.  See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, In Rem 
Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 11 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 281-84 (2002) (discussing the rules versus standards debate, 
generally, and arguing for the application of a single standard to determine 
jurisdiction in cyberspace); Faigman, supra note 111, at 646-55 (considering the 
balancing of these issues in constitutional adjudication); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The 
Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 837-49 (1994) 
(concluding that some balancing is inevitable, and though there are conflicting 
definitions of what balancing is, the real question is how and when it should be 
used). 
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the effects prong of the undue burden standard is “standard-less” is 
that this feature actually serves the positive purpose of allowing courts 
to address individual situations to best balance the individual right 
and the state interest at stake in any given dispute.118  In short, what 
others view as a weakness, I perceive as a strength. 
C. The “Purpose” Prong of the Undue Burden Standard 
This Article proposes that a law is invalid under the undue burden 
standard if the state had the primary purpose of creating an obstacle 
(whether substantial or otherwise) to the exercise of the right to 
refuse medical treatment in lieu of actually advancing the state’s 
interest in the protection and preservation of life.  There are two 
independent goals underlying this prong of the analysis. 
First, my impetus for advocating the adoption of the undue burden 
standard is the unique place that the protection of life should have in 
the constitutional calculus.119  If such protection is not, in fact, the 
primary reason for the state’s action, then any infringement on the 
right should fail.120  In other words, without a primary motivation to 
protect and preserve life, there would be no reason to create the 
undue burden standard in the first place. 
A second goal underlying the purpose prong is generally to police 
government conduct.  Government action taken for the sole or 
dominant purpose of depriving a person or group of persons of a 
right is inherently suspect.121  The purpose prong of the analysis is, in 
                                                          
 118. The joint opinion in Casey mounted a related defense of its standard: 
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims 
may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that 
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised:  reasoned 
judgment.  Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule.  
That does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices with which 
we disagree; yet neither does it permit us to shrink from the duties of our 
office. 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 849. 
 119. See infra Parts I.B-C (discussing the state’s interest in protecting existing 
human life and the inadequacies of current fundamental right jurisprudence in 
balancing between the state’s interest and the right to refuse life sustaining 
treatment). 
 120. This assumes that there is no other compelling state interest, narrowly 
tailored to the problem at hand, that the government could use to justify the action 
under traditional strict scrutiny analysis. 
 121. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (articulating the Court’s use of a more probing rational basis review 
when the objective of a law appears to be to the “desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (pointing out that 
animosity towards a specific group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest); 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (clarifying that the 
state, in creating policies and legislation, “may not rely on a classification whose 
relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary 
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part, designed to ensure that the government is not acting with such 
a highly questionable motive. 
Two criticisms of the purpose prong of the analysis immediately 
come to the fore—one specific to the “right to die” area and the 
other relevant more generally to constitutional analysis.  The more 
general issue is whether it is possible to inquire into the motivation 
behind any given legislative act, a point about which there has been 
spirited debate within the Supreme Court.122  Despite these debates, 
in a number of contexts the Court has held that a proper 
constitutional analysis requires at least some consideration of 
legislative motivations.123  Moreover, courts are not without means to 
conduct such an inquiry.  To take just a few possibilities, a court can 
consider the text of the statute, its legislative history, deviations from 
normal procedures in enacting the legislation, and analysis of the 
events leading up to the passage of a given piece of legislation.124 
                                                          
or irrational”); Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-36 (1973) (finding that 
the government’s denial of federal food assistance to households with one or more 
unrelated members was irrational and that a “bare . . . desire to harm” cannot be a 
“legitimate” governmental interest).  See also Dorf, supra note 94, at 1233-34 
(discussing the suspicion inherent when a government acts with the intention of 
infringing a right). 
 122. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 682 n.3 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (analyzing a dormant commerce clause challenge by 
exploring the actual motivation of the legislature and rejecting the dissent’s claims 
that such an inquiry is impracticable); id. at 702-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(claiming that consideration of actual legislative purpose is unwarranted and 
practically impossible); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 186-93 
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (advocating a search for the actual purpose of 
legislative action under review and criticizing the majority opinion for refusing to 
conduct such an analysis). 
 123. The specific situations in which the Court has held legislative purpose to be 
an important consideration include:  (1) evaluating government action under the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, see Brownstein, supra note 80, at 939-41 
(collecting and analyzing cases under the Establishment Clause); (2) setting the 
outer limits on Congress’s use of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (suggesting that the Court would 
strike down a law passed by Congress if it were a mere pretext to act in an area 
otherwise forbidden by the Constitution); (3) invalidating government actions when 
the motivation for the laws at issue was a “bare desire to harm” a certain group, see, 
e.g., cases cited supra note 121 (relating to the analysis of legislative motivation, 
specifically the “bare desire to harm”); and, (4) using dormant commerce clause 
principles to evaluate state actions to determine whether a given regulation is 
motivated by economic protectionism, see Brownstein, supra note 80, at 891-92 n.77 
(showing that certain state objectives are presumptively valid or at least legitimate, 
while others are presumptively invalid, by analogizing Dormant Commerce Clause 
cases).  Use of legislative motivation is also supported by thoughtful academic 
commentary.  E.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 136-70 (1980).   
 124. See infra Part III.A (providing an example of consideration of such 
information in the context of applying the standard to Terri’s Law).   
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Finally, the standard is phrased in such a way that the interest in 
preserving life need only be the primary motivation for acting.  Thus, 
evidence that other motivations existed, something likely to occur 
when dealing with multi-member bodies,125 would not require 
invalidation of the law unless those other reasons became, in the 
aggregate, the primary motivation for the action.  The bottom line is 
that such a general attack on the purpose prong of the analysis is 
unpersuasive. 
The more targeted criticism of the purpose prong concerns 
whether the standard will actually add anything of substance to the 
analysis.  To understand this possible fault in the standard, one must 
recall that the joint opinion in Casey explained the utility of the 
purpose prong of its analysis in the following way: 
A statute with [the purpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion] is invalid because 
the means chosen by the state to further the interest in potential 
life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not 
hinder it.126 
Thus, the use of the purpose prong in Casey was to ensure that the 
government action was not designed as a means to make the exercise 
of the right more difficult but rather as a means of increasing the 
woman’s contemplation of the decision to abort a non-viable fetus.127 
The Casey incarnation of the standard does not translate well when 
the right to refuse medical treatment is substituted for the abortion 
right.  As I have set up the equation, the entire reason that the undue 
burden standard is appropriate is because the state has a powerful 
interest not simply in making its citizens think about life, but in 
actually fostering the preservation of existing life on both individual 
and community bases.128  Thus, it would seem that if the goal behind 
the Casey standard were the same goal in the right to refuse medical 
treatment situation, all state actions would fail because, by my 
definition, the state is trying to stop citizens seeking death. 
                                                          
 125. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 702-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cataloguing 
perceived problems with searching for legislative intent, including the difficulty of 
ascribing motivation to a legislative body comprised of more than one member); see 
also Dorf, supra note 94, at 1234 (noting that “the purpose of a law enacted by a 
multi-member body may be indeterminate”). 
 126. 505 U.S. at 877. 
 127. See id. at 882-95 (deciding that the state may require doctors to inform a 
woman seeking an abortion about the possible consequences to herself and to the 
fetus, and that the state may also require a twenty-four hour waiting period, but 
finding the requirement for spousal consent to be an undue burden). 
 128. See supra Parts I.B-C (analyzing the state’s need to protect both the lives and 
rights of its citizens). 
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This hypothesized criticism is not troubling, however, because the 
goal of the purpose prong in the right to die context is more limited, 
although no less important, than the abortion-focused goal in Casey.  
In Casey, the Court worked on the premise that it was improper for a 
state to attempt to place an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion.129  In the context of the right to refuse medical 
treatment, my premise is that it is legitimate for the state to have the 
goal of preventing death for any and all of its citizens.  However, it is 
not proper for the state to simply profess that goal while it actually 
has another primary motivation.  Therefore, the purpose prong in 
the proposed standard is designed to ensure, as much as possible 
given the difficulty in determining legislative motivation, that the 
state is actually pursuing its life preservation goal.  If the state is 
pursuing another goal, the reason for judging the state infringement 
of a fundamental right at a standard less rigorous than strict scrutiny 
has evaporated.  In the end, while the purpose standard I envision 
likely will have an impact in only a small number of situations, 
preventing state infringement in those situations is an important 
check on the abuse of government power.130  It seeks to ensure that 
the lessening of protection for a fundamental right that is inherent in 
the adoption of the standard, is as limited as possible. 
This Part set forth the contours of the proposed undue burden 
standard and the theoretical grounds for it.  It also attempted to 
anticipate certain prominent objections that could be raised to the 
adoption of this standard to judge infringements on the right to 
                                                          
 129. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (equating a state 
regulation that by “purpose or effect” creates a substantial obstacle for a woman 
attempting to get an abortion with an undue burden).  It is true that a literal reading 
of the Casey standard would suggest that only a purpose to impose a substantial 
obstacle ran afoul of the purpose prong, implicitly allowing the state to have the 
purpose of imposing a non-substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion of a non-
viable fetus.  Id.  As others have pointed out, however, such a literal reading of Casey 
makes no sense in the context of the joint opinion as a whole.  See, e.g., Brownstein, 
supra note 80, at 883-84 n.53 (suggesting a more workable reading of the joint 
opinion).  As Professor Brownstein concludes, “[t]he more plausible interpretation 
of the joint opinion suggests that any law solely intended to prevent women from 
obtaining abortions by burdening their choice serves an impermissible purpose.”  Id.; 
see also Dorf, supra note 94, at 1233-35 (noting the same tension in Casey and 
suggesting that the language was partly sloppy drafting and partly a reflection of an 
underlying theme in the case concerning the difference between an incidental and 
direct burden on the exercise of any right).  In any event, the purpose prong of the 
analysis I have crafted does not track the language in Casey that has caused this 
particular type of confusion.  See, e.g., supra Part II.A (setting forth and analyzing the 
procedural steps taken to apply the undue burden standard). 
 130. But cf. Brownstein, supra note 80, at 884-85 (noting with respect to the Casey 
standard that “[i]n practice, however, it may be difficult to establish that a regulation 
that does not create a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion was adopted for 
the purpose of interfering with the exercise of this fundamental right”). 
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refuse medical treatment.  The next Part continues the exploration 
of both the operation of the standard and its potential weaknesses by 
considering how it would be used to judge three different 
government infringements of an individual’s right to refuse medical 
treatment. 
III. APPLYING THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD 
Having described the details of, and theoretical underpinnings for, 
the undue burden standard proposed, the discussion now proceeds 
to how that standard would apply in practice.  The following three 
situations allow an exploration of both the purpose and effect prongs 
of the analysis.  In addition to demonstrating the standard’s 
application, these examples are also designed to raise some of the 
more difficult issues in this area.  The three examples discussed 
concern (1) the Florida Legislature’s enactment of Terri’s Law 
attempting to reverse a court decision ordering the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, (2) a hypothetical state law under which 
incompetent adults without a “living will” or “advance health care 
directive” would be precluded from refusing or ceasing life-sustaining 
medical treatment, and (3) a hypothetical state law that, in addition 
to the conditions set out for example number two, also precludes 
recognition of a now incompetent person’s wishes as reflected in a 
“living will” or “advance health care directive.” 
Three preliminary points are worth making.  First, I have assumed 
for the purpose of each example that the individual has carried the 
burden to show an infringement of the right to refuse medical 
treatment.  Second, while I have attempted to select examples that 
raise a variety of issues, they will invariably not cover every 
conceivable situation.  I have not meant to give short shrift to any 
particular type of question.  In the end, the examples should be 
sufficient to provide a good picture of the standard in operation.  
Finally, because the proposed standard is designed to allow courts to 
exercise a fair degree of discretion, readers may reach different 
conclusions with respect to any given example.  Some reasonable 
variation in outcomes is an inevitable feature of a standard based on 
discretion.  Such variation only becomes a reason to reject a standard 
when results over time yield no workable rules by which states and 
individuals can plan their conduct.  While I do not believe the 
standard I propose is, in fact, unworkable, the ultimate conclusion on 
this point would need to await the results of actual use of the 
standard over time. 
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A. Terri’s Law 
As described earlier, the story of Terri Schiavo is a modern day saga 
having played out in a variety of hospitals and other health care 
facilities, all levels of the Florida state court system, the federal courts 
in Florida, and the Florida Legislature and the Governor’s office.131  
Terri Schiavo has been in a persistent vegetative state since early 
1990.132  After several years of litigation with many twists and turns, a 
final court order was in place as of October 15, 2003 ordering the 
withdrawal of a feeding tube, which was providing Ms. Schiavo with 
nutrition and hydration.133  The decision was made in accordance 
with Florida statutory law.  This law essentially provided that if an 
incompetent adult had not, while competent, provided written 
instructions concerning the provision of medical treatment, a court 
could order the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment if it 
was established by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would not have chosen to continue receiving the medical treatment 
at issue.134 
Ms. Schiavo’s feeding tube was removed pursuant to the court 
order on October 15, 2003.135  Thereafter, a coordinated campaign, 
apparently largely fueled by conservative organizations, pushed the 
Florida Legislature to take some action.136  At least in part as a result 
                                                          
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 19-30 (describing the procedural history, 
facts, and circumstances of the Schiavo case). 
 132. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 133. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).  
On October 21, however, the Florida Legislature enacted Terri’s Law, authorizing 
the Governor to stay the trial court’s order.  See 2003 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 418 (West). 
 134. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(3) (2004). 
 135. Woman’s Feeding Tube Removed, supra note 25. 
 136. See, e.g., Subversion of the Right to Die?, supra note 28 (observing that Terri’s 
Law was drawn to match only Terri Schiavo’s condition); Wes Allison, New Life for the 
Right-to-Life Movement, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at 1A (noting that 
pressure from right-to-life and Christian advocates probably greatly influenced 
Governor Jeb Bush’s actions); Dudley Clendinen, “My Father Wasn’t There”:  Reflecting 
on the End of Life, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 2003, at 1J (commenting that the 
political pressure caused by “public prayer vigils, demonstrations, and a global e-mail 
campaign” dealing with Terri Schiavo’s situation is similar to that usually caused by 
fights over abortion); Abby Goodnough, Victory in Florida Feeding Tube Case Emboldens 
the Religious Right, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2003, at A1 (reporting on the role that 
religious conservatives played in the legislative challenge); Betty Parker, Political 
Fallout from Schiavo Vote Unknown, THE NEWS-PRESS, Oct. 27, 2003, at 1B; Michael 
Romano, Separation of Health, State, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 27, 2003, at 4 (arguing 
that legislative energies spent on medical activities could be used more wisely; in 
effect, healthcare has become politicized).  But see Mark Silva, Governor Acts on Beliefs, 
Not to Win Political Backing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 22, 2003, at A1 (arguing that at 
least Governor Bush did not act out of a political motive in connection with Terri’s 
Law).  The political pressure most observers recognized in connection with Terri’s 
Law is similar to the connection between anti-abortion advocacy and organized 
opposition to the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment observed shortly 
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of this pressure, the Florida Legislature passed a bill on October 21, 
2003—now commonly known as Terri’s Law—the effect of which was 
to give Florida Governor Jeb Bush the power to overturn the court’s 
decision concerning Terri Schiavo.137  Governor Bush immediately 
exercised his authority under Terri’s Law and ordered the reinsertion 
of Ms. Schiavo’s feeding tube.138 
After Governor Bush issued his “stay,” Ms. Schiavo’s husband and 
guardian filed suit seeking a declaration that Terri’s Law was 
unconstitutional under various provisions of the United States and 
Florida Constitutions.139  For purposes of this exercise, the focus will 
only be on a challenge to Terri’s Law under the United States 
Constitution.  The theory advanced in the case is that Terri’s Law 
violates Ms. Schiavo’s constitutionally protected right to refuse 
medical treatment.140  Given the unsettled nature of the right to 
refuse medical treatment after Cruzan,141 it is difficult to determine 
exactly what standard a court will use to evaluate the federal 
                                                          
after Cruzan.  See Robertson, supra note 10, at 1140 n.4 (commenting that some 
“extreme vitalists” would require protection for prenatal life “regardless of its quality 
or functional ability,” fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses). 
 137. The full text of Terri’s Law is as follows: 
Section 1. (1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time stay 
to prevent the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of 
October 15, 2003: 
(a) That patient has no written advance directive; 
(b) The court has found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative state; 
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and 
(d) A member of that patient’s family has challenged the withholding of 
nutrition and hydration. 
(2) The Governor’s authority to issue the stay expires 15 days after the 
effective date of this act, and the expiration of that authority does not impact 
the validity or the effect of any stay issued pursuant to this act.  The 
Governor may lift the stay authorized under this act at anytime.  A person 
may not be held civilly liable and is not subject to regulatory or disciplinary 
sanctions for taking any action to comply with a stay issued by the Governor 
pursuant to this act. 
(3) Upon the issuance of a stay, the chief judge of the circuit court shall 
appoint a guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to the 
Governor and the court. 
Section 2.  This act shall take effect upon becoming a law. 
2003 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 418 (West). 
 138. See William R. Levesque et al., Gov. Bush’s Order Puts Schiavo Back on Fluids, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at 1A (giving a timeline of the bill’s passage and 
the Governor’s order to reinsert the feeding tube). 
 139. See Schiavo v. Bush, No. 03-008212-CI-20, 2004 WL 980028, at *6-7 (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. May 5, 2004) (declaring that “Terri’s Law” created both an “unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power” and an “unconstitutional authority to interfere with 
right of privacy”).  The Supreme Court of Florida has agreed to hear an appeal of the 
lower court’s decision.  See Bush v. Schiavo, Case No. SC04-925 (Fla. June 16, 2004). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See supra Part I.A (discussing the current state of a constitutional right to 
refuse medical treatment). 
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constitutional challenge to Terri’s Law, if indeed the courts reach the 
federal issues at all.142  For our purposes, however, this Article will 
explore how a court would evaluate a challenge to Terri’s Law under 
the undue burden standard previously advocated. 
An application of the undue burden standard indicates that a 
challenge to Terri’s Law should be successful under the purpose 
prong of the analysis.143  One can reach this conclusion by evaluating 
the events leading up to the law, its legislative history, and its text.  
First, there is a strong and probably justified perception that the 
Florida Legislature was prompted to take action purely because of 
politics.144  The evidence is fairly clear that a certain political faction 
pressured Florida legislators to overturn the court decision as part of 
a larger political agenda.145  Thus, there is, at a minimum, a suspicion 
concerning the state’s purpose or motivation in enacting the law. 
Second, the legislative history of Terri’s Law reinforces this 
suspicion.  There were no hearings or public comment of any kind 
before the legislation was passed.146  Thus, the legislative history of 
Terri’s Law does nothing to refute the political motivation for the Act 
and, if anything, only adds to the cloud surrounding the Legislature’s 
action. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the text of Terri’s Law itself 
undercuts any suggestion that the Legislature’s purpose was the 
preservation of life.  By its terms, the Act applied only to an 
                                                          
 142. The Florida Circuit Court of Pinellas County recently decided that Terri’s 
Law was unconstitutional using a strict scrutiny analysis, but doing so under the 
Florida Constitution’s explicit protection of the right to privacy.  Schiavo, 2004 WL 
980028, at *4. 
 143. Under the purpose prong, a law is invalid if the state had the primary 
purpose of creating an obstacle (whether substantial or otherwise) in the exercise of 
the right to refuse medical treatment instead of actually advancing the state’s interest 
in the protection and preservation of life. 
 144. See supra text accompanying note 136 (noting the political pressure that right-
to-life and Christian advocates exerted on the Florida Legislature to enact Terri’s 
Law). 
 145. See Allison, supra note 136, at 1A, 8A (indicating that organizations, such as 
the National Right To Life Committee, regarded Terri’s Law as crucial in the larger 
right to life battle). 
 146. See FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY FOR HOUSE 




stPageIndex=0 (Oct. 21, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(providing a description of the Florida House of Representatives’ Bill Activity for Bill 
35E and highlighting its brisk passage through the House and Senate); see also 
Clendinen, supra note 136, at 3J (noting that Terri’s Law was passed “after one day of 
debate”). 
ALLEN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 10/3/2004  5:52 PM 
1012 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:971 
extraordinarily narrow “class.”147  In fact, there does not appear to be 
any person in Florida other than Terri Schiavo who would have met 
the classification set out in the statute.  Even if there had been such 
people, the Legislature mandated that the Act, although not any stay 
issued under it, would expire fifteen days after its effective date.148  In 
other words, any life-sustaining benefit of Terri’s Law would not last 
unless Governor Bush exercised his discretion to issue a “stay.”  
Finally, in passing Terri’s Law, the Legislature did not change Florida 
law in any other respect.  Thus, the Florida law under which the 
courts operated in the case was never displaced and is still in effect 
today.149 
Based on all of these circumstances, it seems fairly clear that the 
Florida Legislature was not acting in furtherance of a State policy to 
preserve life.  Even if the Legislature was partially motivated to 
protect and preserve Ms. Schiavo’s life, it is highly unlikely that the 
state could carry its burden of demonstrating that the preservation of 
life was its primary purpose in enacting Terri’s Law.150  The simple 
fact is that the Legislature chose in this one case to alter the result 
reached by the courts under the laws the Legislature itself passed, 
probably under political pressure.  As a result, a challenge to Terri’s 
Law under the undue burden standard would be successful.151 
                                                          
 147. See Governor—Feeding Tube Removal Stay, 2003 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 418 
(West) (narrowing the class to patients who are in a persistent vegetative state, who 
are not receiving nutrition and hydration, whose family has directly challenged the 
withholding of nutrition and hydration, and who have no written advance directive 
on what to do in such a situation). 
 148. Id. § 2. 
 149. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765.101-401 (2003) (allowing the withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment when clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that 
a person would not have wanted such treatment). 
 150. One might say that even if there is no evidence that the state’s motivation was 
to protect all life, Florida definitely intended to preserve Ms. Schiavo’s life.  While 
such an argument might be plausible in the abstract based simply on cause and 
effect, it does not make sense in the context of the facts of the case.  At the 
beginning of this saga, the basis upon which Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube was 
removed was a statute passed by the Florida Legislature.  See In re Guardianship of 
Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. 2001) (noting that the decision was made pursuant 
to Chapter 765 of the Florida statutes as well as common law guardianship 
procedures).  So, the Legislature seemed to change the rules concerning Ms. Schiavo 
well into the game.  Such an action again raises a suspicion that there was more 
going on than met the eye.  Moreover, it is odd that the Legislature decided to 
protect Ms. Schiavo’s life while leaving millions of other Floridians subject to a 
statutory scheme that did not reflect an extreme vitalist theory.  Such an intent would 
certainly be susceptible to an argument that the Legislature was not even acting 
rationally.  In short, the facts in many ways speak for themselves about the rank 
political motivations of the Legislature in enacting Terri’s Law.  That motivation 
really had very little to do with life, on either a focused or comprehensive basis. 
 151. Because a challenge to Terri’s Law would be successful under the purpose 
prong of the analysis, there would be no need to analyze it in terms of its effects. 
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B. Restricting the Ability of an Incompetent Adult, Without a “Living Will” 
or Similar Device, to Cease or Refuse Medical Treatment 
The example concerning Terri’s Law focused attention on the 
purpose prong of the undue burden standard.  The following 
examples deal with the effects prong of the analysis.  They also deal 
with the incredibly difficult issue of how a competent adult’s right to 
refuse medical treatment is applied to a person who has become 
incompetent as a result of an accident or a medical condition.  There 
has been much written about this issue, discussing the theoretical 
underpinning of the “transference” of the right, whether the right 
should or can logically be said to apply to an incompetent adult, and 
if the right is to apply to an incompetent adult, how it should be 
exercised.152  The purpose of this Article is not to revisit these debates 
                                                          
 152. The issue has been the subject of much discussion in the state courts.  See, 
e.g., In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67-77 (Wis. 1992) (holding that an incompetent 
patient’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment emanates from the rights of 
self-determination and informed consent); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 
2d 4, 9-13 (Fla. 1990) (holding that an incompetent patient’s right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment is protected by the right of privacy under the Florida 
Constitution, so long as the wishes were expressed orally or in writing prior to 
incompetency); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-37 (N.J. 1985) (allowing for the 
removal of life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent patient in any of three 
scenarios:  (1) where clear and convincing evidence suggests that the patient would 
refuse treatment under the circumstances (subjective test); (2) where clear and 
convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes is lacking, but the burden of continued 
pain outweighs the benefit of continued life (limited objective test); and, (3) where 
continuing medical treatment would be inhumane (also called a pure objective 
test)); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423-32 
(Mass. 1977) (finding that the right to refuse medical treatment should transfer to 
an incompetent patient and that a surrogate decision-maker should make this 
subjective judgment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976) (determining 
that the right to refuse medical treatment should transfer to an incompetent patient 
because the right of privacy supercedes the state interest in life).  It has also been the 
subject of intense scrutiny in academic commentary.  See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & 
Daniel Avila, The Sirens’ Lure of Invented Consent:  A Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate 
Decisionmaking for Legally Incapacitated Older Persons, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 779, 781 (1991) 
(supporting the transference of the right to refuse medical treatment to incompetent 
patients but denouncing surrogate decisionmaking as an erosion of patients’ 
autonomy rights); Susan Adler Channick, The Myth of Autonomy at the End-of-Life:  
Questioning the Paradigm of Rights, 44 VILL. L. REV. 577, 630 (1999) (suggesting that an 
incompetent person’s right to refuse medical treatment should be exercised 
according to a “consumer welfare” model based on informed consent instead of an 
autonomy model); Rebecca Dressler, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 
425 (1990) (concurring with Professor Nancy Rhoden that incompetent persons 
should be able to refuse medical treatment based on their prior wishes, but opting 
instead for a more objective standard); Rebecca Dressler, Life, Death and Incompetent 
Patients:  Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 374 
(1986) (advocating a “present best interests” standard, instead of a simple best 
interests standard, for incompetent patients who did not express their preference for 
medical treatment prior to incompetency); Linda C. Fentiman, Privacy and Personhood 
Revisited:  A New Framework for Substitute Decisionmaking for the Incompetent, Incurably Ill 
Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 843 (1989) (recommending a “conversation 
model” for surrogate decisionmaking); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine:  Legal 
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or to advance a substantive argument as to the appropriate resolution 
of the issue.  Rather, this Article will assume that a presently 
incompetent adult retains the right to refuse medical treatment.153  
The question will then be whether certain infringements on that 
right amount to a constitutional violation under the undue burden 
standard. 
The particular hypothetical situation considered in this sub-part 
concerns a state that provides the means for a competent person to 
accept or decline medical treatment in the event of future 
incompetency.154  This hypothetical state, however, has made the 
policy judgment that if a person has not, while competent, drafted a 
“living will” or otherwise decided whether to accept or decline 
medical treatment in the event of future incompetency, then no such 
means will later become available.155  In other words, the state has 
adopted a strong vitalist attitude. It will protect the lives of 
incompetent people for whom—in the absence of taking the 
appropriate formal steps while competent—their wishes could only 
be divined through substituting another’s judgment, whether a family 
                                                          
Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 40-46 (1990) (tracing 
the history of substituted judgment and specifically, its application to incompetent 
patients); Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 10, at 818 (charging that the right to 
refuse medical treatment should apply to an incompetent adult and should be 
exercised by close family members, with the role of the state remaining secondary); 
Pollock, supra note 10, at 520 (noting that a best interests test should be applied to 
persons who never indicated their preference for medical treatment while 
competent); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 375 
(1988) (supporting the right to refuse medical treatment for incompetent patients 
but advocating family decision-making and living wills as the preferable method); 
Robertson, supra note 10, at 1140 (contending that the right to refuse medical 
treatment should apply to an incompetent adult and should be exercised from the 
standpoint of present incompetency and not the person’s prior wishes); Michele 
Yuen, Letting Daddy Die:  Adopting New Standards for Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 581, 584 (1992) (proposing that the right to refuse medical treatment should 
be applied to an incompetent adult only under a best interests standard). 
 153. The Supreme Court has taken at least a tentative position recognizing that an 
incompetent adult retains whatever protection the Constitution affords to competent 
adults concerning the refusal of medical treatment.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1990). 
 154. See infra note 162 and accompanying text (reaffirming that the various means 
of dictating future treatment decisions are beyond the scope of this Article). 
 155. Courts and legislatures have crafted a wide array of standards by which an 
incompetent person may be removed from life-sustaining medical treatment.  A 
discussion of these mechanisms, including their strengths and weaknesses, is well 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Generally speaking, these standards range from 
attempting to determine what the incompetent person would have wanted 
(“substituted judgment”) to what is in the “best interests” of the incompetent person, 
to allowing a surrogate (usually a family member or court) to make the decision on 
the incompetent person’s behalf.  See supra note 152 and accompanying text 
(providing a sampling of state rules and scholarly critiques on this topic); see generally 
MEISEL, supra note 2, §§ 7.1-7.46 (describing and critiquing the various approaches 
the states have taken). 
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member or a court, for that of the incompetent person.  This process 
is filled with built-in margins of error.156 
The issue to be addressed here is whether this hypothetical state  
action would be unconstitutional under the effects prong of the 
undue burden analysis.157  Under this prong, a government’s action 
infringing the right to refuse medical treatment is unconstitutional if 
it has the effect of creating a substantial obstacle to an individual’s 
exercise of this right.  As explained below, such a law does not create 
a substantial burden and therefore would be found constitutional 
under the undue burden standard.158 
There is no question that the legislative scheme outlined above 
would deprive some individuals of their right to refuse medical 
treatment.  Thus, the scheme creates an obstacle and, for some 
persons, an insurmountable one.  But the obstacle is insurmountable 
only because the person, while competent, did not draft a “living will” 
or otherwise decide whether to accept or decline medical treatment 
in the event of incompetency.  If a state could not make the 
extremely pro-vitalist value choice in a situation such as this one, it 
would seem that the undue burden standard would be nothing more 
than strict scrutiny in disguise.  After all, the state has created 
mechanisms by which all competent adults can effectively trump the 
                                                          
 156. It appears that no state has taken the position hypothesized in this sub-part.  
In actuality, there is a wide spectrum of vitalist attitudes among the states, with some 
closer to this Article’s position than others.  For example, Missouri is certainly more 
vitalist in its consideration of medical decisions for incompetent patients than is New 
Jersey.  Compare Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417-18 (Mo. 1988) (refusing to 
extend the penumbral right to privacy to the removal of life-sustaining food and 
water from incompetent patients), with In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (N.J. 
1985) (allowing for the removal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent 
patients in any of three scenarios).  The attraction of the undue burden standard for 
evaluating actions along this spectrum is that it will allow a wide range of state action 
and will also provide a backstop of protection if the state adopts too aggressive a 
vitalist position to comport with the Constitution. 
 157. This Article does not posit facts from which it would appear that the state 
would run afoul of the purpose prong of the analysis.  In other words, this Article 
assumes that the state is acting out of a sincere policy favoring the preservation of 
life.  For example, the state may have concluded that the risk of error that is inherent 
in a substituted judgment or best interests test is, on the whole, too great to risk the 
loss of lives that could occur if inaccurate decisions are made.  Moreover, the state 
may have concluded that even an increased standard of proof, such as clear and 
convincing evidence, does not reduce the risk of error sufficiently. 
 158. The majority opinion in Cruzan expressly left open the related issue “whether 
a [s]tate might be required to defer to the decision of a surrogate if competent and 
probative evidence established that the patient herself had expressed a desire that 
the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment be made for that individual.”  497 
U.S. at 287 n.12.  In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor was more 
forthcoming with her view, writing that “such a duty [to defer to a proxy decision-
maker] may well be constitutionally required to protect the patient’s liberty interest 
in refusing medical treatment.”  Id. at 289. 
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state’s default, life-favoring policy.  A finding of unconstitutionality 
under these conditions would be inconsistent, however, with the 
premise upon which the undue burden standard has been created:  
the need to provide due respect for both the individual right and the 
state interest in the preservation of life.  In sum, the fact that the 
statutory scheme makes it possible for all competent adults to ensure 
that their right to refuse medical treatment is protected should they 
become incompetent means that there is no creation of a “substantial 
obstacle” to the exercise of the right.  This is so even though a person 
not taking the required steps will be foreclosed from exercising the 
right. 
The perceptive reader will probably identify a significant criticism 
with this suggestion.  In particular, this theory would result in the 
systematic deprivation of certain groups in the population of the 
right to refuse medical treatment when rendered incompetent.  Such 
groups would include those that are less able or likely to take 
advantage of the means the state provides to ensure that the right is 
preserved:  the young, the poor, and the uneducated.159  This 
criticism is a serious one and cannot be taken lightly.  Ultimately, it is 
unpersuasive because applying the undue burden standard requires 
balancing.  The unfortunate reality is that there are, and always have 
been, inequities in our society flowing from age, wealth, and social 
class.  To allow those inequities to tip the scales in the undue burden 
analysis would lead us back into an undervaluation of the state‘s 
interest in life.  This standard forces difficult choices in order to 
ensure an appropriate balance of the state’s interest and individual 
rights.  Here, the state left open avenues to protect the right; it 
hopefully will also have taken steps to publicize those actions.  If 
individuals do not take advantage of those avenues to preserve a 
right, then the ultimate outcome is that their rights, when those 
                                                          
 159. Others have likewise observed that these groups could be harmed by a policy 
favoring the use of advance directives and living wills.  See Channick, supra note 152, 
at 628 (noting that young people do not generally use advance directives and that 
advance directives are not always reliable because the underprivileged sometimes 
intend them to be executed by physicians exercising discretion); Martyn & 
Bourguignon, supra note 10, at 838 (highlighting the young as particularly 
vulnerable because they rarely express their preference for life-prolonging medical 
treatment).  Cf. Metzger, supra note 116, at 2066-67 (making a similar point 
concerning the application of the undue burden standard to abortion regulations).  
At least one court has also recognized the possibility that advance directives would 
discriminate against the underprivileged.  In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 
N.E.2d 607, 614 (N.Y. 1988) (“Of course, a requirement of a written expression in 
every case would be unrealistic.  Further, it would unfairly penalize those who lack 
the skills to place their feelings in writing.”). 
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persons are rendered incompetent, will be lost.160  This is not a 
favorable policy choice, but it comports with the constitutional safety-
net the undue burden standard ensures. 
C. Elimination of the Option of a “Living Will” or                                  
Similar Advance Directive 
This section builds on the hypothetical considered in the prior sub-
part.  First, assume that a state continues to deny incompetent adults 
the ability to exercise their right to refuse medical treatment.161  
Further, assume that the state provides no lawful means for a 
competent adult, while competent, to decide whether to accept or 
decline medical treatment in the event of future incompetency.162  
Thus, under this scenario a competent person is still able to refuse 
medical treatment while competent, but there is no mechanism to do 
so if this person should be rendered incompetent or too ill to act.  
What is the outcome of an undue burden analysis with respect to this 
statutory scheme?163 
This analysis is brief, given what has come before.  As discussed 
above, a statutory scheme that precludes the right to refuse medical 
treatment after becoming incompetent, but leaves open the means to 
exercise such a right prior to becoming incompetent, would be 
considered constitutional under the undue burden analysis because 
an individual could exercise the right to refuse medical treatment 
                                                          
 160. Professor Robertson reached much the same conclusion, although in less 
sympathetic terms.  In rejecting the basic criticism to a rule requiring written 
directives outlined above, he wrote: 
This criticism is unpersuasive.  If the right [to refuse medical treatment] 
concerns the considered exercise of autonomy, then one simply must 
exercise it in a considered way.  It is not unreasonable to require that the 
exercise in fact occur and that it be documented in writing or be made 
explicit in some other manner to provide proof that it was exercised, just as 
written contracts are required for certain other autonomous decisions.  A 
less restrictive position might lead to erroneous determinations and 
premature death of incompetent patients who possess interests in treatment. 
Robertson, supra note 10, at 1165-66 (footnote omitted). 
 161. See supra Part III.B (denying the right only if incompetent adults failed to 
exercise it while competent). 
 162. There are a number of ways that states commonly provide for competent 
adults to essentially dictate how treatment decisions can and should be made if the 
person becomes incompetent.  Once again, this Article does not critique the various 
approaches the states have taken on this issue.  See generally MEISEL, supra note 2, 
§§ 10.1-14.10 (discussing different methods such as advance directives, living wills, 
proxy directives, and surrogate decision-making that states have legislated to allow 
competent adults make future treatment decisions). 
 163. Assume again that the state has a valid motivation to preserve and protect 
life.  In other words, assume that the state would be able to carry its burden under 
the purpose prong of the analysis. 
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simply by taking certain action while competent.164  In the current 
hypothetical, there is no way for an individual to secure the exercise 
of the right to refuse medical treatment while incompetent.  This 
individual cannot do so through a surrogate after being rendered 
incompetent.  Moreover, nothing the person can do while competent 
can protect this right.  In this situation, the state would have erected a 
“substantial obstacle” in the path of individuals seeking to exercise 
their right to refuse medical treatment because there could be no 
situation in which an incompetent person could exercise that right.  
Thus, the statutory scheme hypothesized above would be 
unconstitutional under the undue burden standard. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes that the undue burden standard should be 
adopted as the means of analyzing whether infringements on the 
right to refuse medical treatment violate an individual’s 
constitutional right to due process.  Of course, the effect of 
employing the undue burden standard in place of traditional strict 
scrutiny is less protective of fundamental rights.165 Justice Scalia is 
therefore correct, at least in part, when he asserts that an undue 
burden standard is a “dangerous” proposition because of the 
potential loss of protection for rights.166  It is for this reason that this 
Article does not advocate the use of that standard in any area of 
substantive due process beyond those limited cases in which the state 
asserts as a counterbalance to the fundamental right an interest in 
the preservation and protection of existing human life.  Courts that 
have done so and commentators who have suggested such an 
approach are in error because of the risk to the protection of 
fundamental rights inherent in moving away from strict scrutiny.167 
                                                          
 164. See supra Part III.B (concluding that such a statutory scheme would not create 
a substantial obstacle in exercising the right to refuse medical treatment because the 
patient, while competent, failed to express any treatment preferences). 
 165. See supra Part I.C (noting that under traditional strict scrutiny the 
fundamental right almost always prevails over the state interest, whereas the undue 
burden analysis is more accommodating of both interests). 
 166. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 965, 988 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 167. At least two courts have used a form of the undue burden standard to 
evaluate substantive due process claims when the state’s asserted interest was not the 
preservation of human life.  See, e.g., Herdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209-10 (Mo. 
1993) (using the Casey undue burden standard to consider grandparent visitation 
rights issue); Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1549 (10th Cir. 1993) (using the Casey 
undue burden standard to consider a dispute concerning First Amendment 
associational rights issue).  Academic commentators have also urged the adoption of 
the standard with respect to broader areas of substantive due process.  See, e.g., Dorf, 
supra note 94, at 1181-82, 1219, 1235-39 (suggesting that an undue burden analysis 
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This Article has two recommendations beyond its main thesis.  
First, the undue burden standard should be expanded only to address 
substantive due process claims concerning the broader 
understanding of the “right to die.”168  Issues at stake in the broader 
right to die context, such as those surrounding physician-assisted 
suicide, have the same features as disputes concerning the right to 
refuse medical treatment:  on one hand there is a state interest in the 
preservation of life while on the other hand there is an individual 
liberty interest in, broadly speaking, bodily integrity.169  Thus, the 
aforementioned “extraordinary” preconditions to using an undue 
burden test are present and in this instance justify a move away from 
strict scrutiny.170 
The second recommendation is that the undue burden standard 
adopted in Casey should not be used to evaluate infringements on the 
right of a woman to have a pre-viability abortion.  Instead, courts 
should apply strict scrutiny because the essential precondition to 
move away from such heightened review is absent.  Roe recognized 
the fundamental right of privacy that a woman has in the control of 
her own body, at least during the pre-viability stage of her 
pregnancy.171  Under the conditions for proper use of the undue 
burden standard, the state interest must be the preservation of life.  
But the interest in the abortion context is the “interest in protecting 
                                                          
currently is and should remain a standard by which to judge incidental burdens on 
the exercise of all fundamental rights except those based on what Professor Dorf 
terms “equality norms”); Lerner, supra note 96, at 364 (arguing for adoption of  an 
undue burden standard concerning home schooling of children). 
 168. See supra note 2 (identifying topics covered by the broader definition of the 
“right to die”). 
 169. It is true that the Court has held that there is no protected liberty interest in 
having help in committing suicide.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-27 
(1997).  However, as several of the concurring opinions in Glucksberg make clear, 
there are still open issues in this area.  See id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(noting that the question “whether a mentally competent person who is 
experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling 
the circumstances of his or her imminent death” was not reached in the decision); id. 
at 741 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the “decision upholding a general 
statutory prohibition of assisted suicide does not mean that every possible application 
of the statute would be valid”). 
 170. Of course, this assumes that there is a fundamental right involved in the 
broader right to die areas.  For present purposes, this Article assumes so. 
 171. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (stating that a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy is “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . “).  Today the interest more 
certainly would be denominated as one of “liberty” and not “privacy.”  See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951 (noting that the right of privacy is not all-
encompassing because the state has a concurrent interest in the preservation of life); 
cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (acknowledging that there is a zone 
of liberty upon which the state cannot impinge). 
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the potentiality of human life.”172  Although a full discussion of this 
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, the interest in potential life is 
not of the same magnitude as the preservation of existing life.  If for 
no other reason, the Court has held that a fetus is not a “person” in 
terms of the Constitutional Due Process protection.173  This is not to 
say that the interest in potential life is unimportant.  Rather, it simply 
does not meet the threshold required to move away from strict 
scrutiny and its strong protection of fundamental rights.174 
In the final analysis, the proposed solution to balance a state’s 
interest in the preservation and protection of life and the individual’s 
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment will probably satisfy 
few people engaged in the debate.  However, this reality is the same 
for any system of balancing interests and rights in which one “side” is 
not given a preference.175  In most situations, I would come down on 
the side of erring in favor of protecting rights and, thus, support the 
protection of fundamental rights through strict scrutiny.  And, 
indeed, parts of this proposal continue to have a pro-rights bias.176  
But there is something special when the state is advancing a true 
interest in the protection of existing life, something that is part of the 
fundamental reason why we have governments in the first place.  In 
this instance—and only in this instance—should courts employ the 
undue burden standard previously described.  In this way, the proper 
respect will be shown to the people, both individually and collectively. 
 
                                                          
 172. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162) (emphasis added). 
 173. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
 174. As an alternative suggestion, if an undue burden standard is still to be used to 
evaluate infringements on the right to have a pre-viability abortion, this Article’s 
general outline of the standard better serves the protection of the right and the 
recognition of the interest.  In particular, the burden of proof should shift to the 
state.  See supra Part II.A (delineating the procedure for applying the undue burden 
standard). 
 175. For example, contrast this Article’s proposal with the almost absolute 
“preferences” accorded to individual rights in strict scrutiny and state interests in 
rationality review.  See supra Part I.C (discussing the binary nature of traditional 
fundamental rights review, where either the individual right or the state interest gets 
plenary protection). 
 176. An example of such a rights-favoring bias is the placement of the burden on 
the state at certain critical points in the process.  See supra Part II.A (noting that the 
burden shifts to the state once the individual has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the law infringes on the right to refuse medical treatment). 
